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Preface

David Rowland Francis of St. Louis, Missouri was appointed United
States ambassador to Russia

by

President Woodrovl Wilson in 1916.

Without question Francis was a well-known, loyal Democrat. Having
served as mayor of St. Louis, governor of �tlssouri, Secretary of the
Interior, president of the Louisiana Purchase Exposition of 1904, and
Democratic "dark horse" for the 'l,,.1hite House, he was active in local
and national politics. His knowledge of Russia, however, was little
and unfortunately vague. He had no previous diplomatic experience and
had previously refused a diplomatic post to Buenos Aries, Argentina.
Yet his appointment to Imperial Russia was approved

by

the Senate

without the usual comr.dttee considerations.
This study is intended to be an exposition of Francis' efforts
while in Soviet Russia and after his return to the United States to
bring about the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime in Soviet Russia.
As the investigation developed, Francis began to crystalize for the
author as a dedicated man up against an impossible situation.

He was

completely ignorant of revolutionaries and ideologies and nothing in
his background or earlier training prepared him for the problems which
beset him after the March 1917 Revolution.
This is not intended to be a definitive biography of David
Rowland Francis.

It touches neither on his successful career as head

of his own commission house in St. Louis nor on his efficient
administrations in public office nor on his avid conservation
interests. The main focus here is on his attitudes and actions

3
concerning the Bolshevik government

and

his work to have it over

thrown. His attitude towards that government was based on many miscon
ceptions and much misinformation, yet he felt it to be evil.

He missed

the real significance of the Com..'111lnist movement, but he was well
meaning and he did what he felt was right.
I am most grateful for the help and encouragement of Professor
James

w.

Crowl of Longwood College who not only suggested the idea for

this thesis but also offered invaluable suggestions for improving it.
I also am indebted to the staff of the Graduate School Library at the
University of Florida, the staff of the Eggleston Library at Hampden
Sydney College, the staff of the Lancaster Library at Longwood College,
and Mrs. Frances H. Stadler, Archivist of the Missouri Historical
Society in st. Louis.
All dates are given according to the Gregorian or Western calendar
except as noted.
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The Historical Background
In February, 1916 George Thomas :Ma.rye suddenly resigned his post
of Ambassador to Russia ostensibly because of failing health, but in
his own words because "political combinations had arisen at home which
affected me

and • • •

I felt impelled to withdraw. nl

By

the middle of

February David Rowland Francis of St. Lou.is, Missouri received a
letter from Secretary of State Robert Lansing offering him that post.
On March 9, 1916 Francis took the oath of office

and

became the last

United States ambassador to Imperial Russia.
The new Ambassador was then in his sixty-fifth year.

For over

half his life he had been actively engaged in his own very successful
Commission Company and Democratic politics. Born on October 1, 1850
at Richmond, Kentucky where his father farmed and had served as county
sheriff, Francis seemed destined to spend his life on the farm.2
Francis received his early education in Richmond Academy which
was a school for girls. This unusual arrangement was ma.de because the
Rev. Robert Breck, the principal of the school, wanted a comrade there
for his own son.

There were no funds available for Francis to continue

his formal education, but fate intervened in the form of his uncle,
David Pitt Rowland.

Rowland, who was a junior partner in the St. Louis

laeorge Thomas Marye, Nearing the End in Imperial Russia (1929;
rpt. New York: Arno Press and the New York Times, 1970), p. 460.
2For the facts of 11r. Francis' early career I am indebted to
W�ltei) B. S �even;!), "David Rowland Francis, 11 DAB (1937), "David
Rowland Francis," NCAB (1904), XII, 9, and "David Rowland Francis,"
NCAB (1935), XXIV, 322.
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commission and uholesale grocery house of Shryock and Rowland, made it
possible for Francis to enter Washington U�iversity in St. Louis.
Francis took a four year classical course and received his B. A.
degree in 1870. He dreamed of studying law but there was no oppor
tunity, and he returned home to Kentucky farming.
That same uncle, however, found Francis a place as a shipping
clerk in his co:im:nission house and launched him on a successful career
as a commission merchant. Within six years Francis had not only paid
off his college debts, but also accumulated enough capital for he and
his brother, Sidney R. Francis, to found the commission house of D. R.
Francis & Brother which became a leading grain firm in St. Louis.
On January 20, 1876 Francis married Jane Perry, the daughter of
John D. Perry, a pioneer railroad builder. They had six sons: John D.
Perry, David Rowland, Jr., Charles Broaddus, Talton Tu.mer, Thomas, and
Sidney R. Three of them followed their father into business.
Francis rose rapidly in the esteem of the merchant comnnmity and
in 1884 was made president of the St. Louis Merchants' Exchange. His
political star rose that year when he was sent as delegate-at-large to
the National Democratic Convention in Chicago.
The following year Francis defeated a Republican, who had been
elected four years earlier by a majority of fourteen thousand, for the
mayorship of St. Louis. His term wa.s known for bringing sound business
practices to the city government and fighting corrupt legislation.
Francis was also becoming known in national politics.

In the

spring of 1887, the then };fayor David R. Francis went to Washington to
invite President Grover Cleveland to attend the G. A. R. Encampment to
be held in St. Louis in September.

Cleveland accepted, but within days

8
veterans• groups vehemently protested his scheduled appearance. 3
Cleveland's recent order to return all Confederate battle flags to
their home states precipitated the unrest, but his recent vetoing of
pension bills was also an irritant.

Francis was still in the East and

Cleveland hastily called him to Washington and requested that Francis
ascertain the St. Louis sentiment on his proposed visit. Francis
reported that while the resident members of the G. A. R. wanted Cleve
land to come, they felt some G. A. R. units would not attend the
encampment or would insult the President if he came.
Francis July 4, 1887,

11

Cleveland wrote to

Ra.ther than abandon my visit to the West and

disappoint your citizens, I might, if I alone were concerned, submit
to the insults to which, it is quite openly asserted, I would be help..
lessly subjected if present at the encampment; but I should bear with
me there the people's highest office, the dignity of which I must
prot�t; and I believe that neither the Gra..�d Arrey of the Republic as
an organization, nor anything like a majority of its members, would
ever encourage any scandalous attacks upon it. 11 4
His term as mayor served in 1889 as a springboard to the Governor's
Ma�sion where he brought the same sound business principles. He
proved to be a real friend to education as he created a school book
connnission and aided the state university in reforming the administra
tion as well as procuring federal and state funds. His efforts
resulted in raising the standards and enhancing the reputation of the
3Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1941),
pp. 336-38.
4ueorge F. Parker, ed., The Writings and Speeches of Grover
Cleveland (New York: Cassell, 1892), p. 399.
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University which recognizes him as her 11 second founder". The esteem
in which he ,1as held is shown by his being referred to as "the Gover
nor" afterwards, even during his diplomatic career.
Francis was one of the Del!lOcrats who supported Cleveland in his
opposition to Bryan and free-silver.

Cleveland highly respected

Francis' political expertise for he mentions discussi..�g the free
silver issue with Governor Francis in a letter to William S. Bissell
on December 12, 1891.5 In March, 1894 Congress passed the Bland
Bill for coining the silver seigniorage in the Treasury, and Cleve
land faced the difficult decision of whether or not to veto it.
Many sound money people favored the bill because the amount of
silver involved was small and the enmity a veto 1-1ould arouse
might jeopardize future legislation.

Others agreed with

Francis who vtrote Cleveland, "If you veto it, the party will
be so irreparable divided and demoralized that defeat will

ensue. n6

In spite of this, Cleveland vetoed the bill.

Francis was considered a prominent Democrat and was included
in

a small group of sound money Democrats who met to plan

strategy for the national Democratic Convention in July 1896.7
· Francis' support of Cleveland was rewarded in August 1896 when he
was appointed Secretary of the Interior to complete the term of Hoke
Smith who had resigned.

Francis only served six months, but it was

on his recommendation that large forest Teserves were set aside by
5Nevins, Grover Cleveland, p. 478.

6Robert McElvoy, Grover Cleveland:
(Mew York: Harper, 1923), II, 80.
7Nevins, Grover Cleveland, p. 700.

The�� the Statesman
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executive order. Re also initiated needed reforms in the department
which were continued under McKinley.
Cleveland's confidence in Francis' loyalty is shown in Cleveland's
letter to Secretary Daniel S. Lamont on September 6, 1896.

Cleveland

discussed the report that a Surveyor-General of a western state was
outspokenly critical of the policy of the Administration particularly
the President.

Cleveland suggested Francis as one of the two men to

investigate the allegation.8
Francis remained a friend of Cleveland's and in a letter on Janu
ary 16, 1898, Cleveland wrote, "Ex-Secretary Francis was here today

and I had a good visit with him. 11 9

For a time Francis was eclipsed in Missouri politics because of
his opposition to Bryan and free-silver.

In the meantime Francis set

about making his dream of a World's Fair at St. Louis come true and
became a tireless worker in planning for the Louisiana Purchase Expo
sition of 1904. After being elected President of the corporation, he
innnediately went t o Washington to see McKinley; and even though the
two men differed on politics, they agreed on the wisdom of a St. Louis
World's Fair.

Congress pledged five million dollars provided St.

Louis could raise an additional ten million. Francis negotiated a six
million dollar pledge from the state of Missouri and was successful in
producing the remainder through private donations. When the European
nations were lacking in enthusiasm because of the recent plethora of
World's fairs and troubles at home, Francis made a whirlwind tour of
8Allan Nevins, ed., Letters of Grover Cleveland, 1850-1908 (New
York: Houghton V.dfflin, 1933), p. 457.
9Nevins, Letters of Grover Cleveland, p. 491.

ll
the courts of Europe and oame home with a dozen promises of participa
tion.10
By 1908 the free-silver issue was dead, and this smoothed the way
for many loyal Democrats, even the most ardent reorganizers of 1906,
• to hail Bryan as "Our Next President".

Francis ,�rote that he 11 had

differed with this man on a question of principle, 11 but ackno..iledged
that "never have I doubted his integrity, his singleness of purpose,
and his loyalty to what he believes is right. 11 ll Realizing Bryan was
the only De��crat who had a chance against Roosevelt and in the
interests of party harmony, Francis advocated Bryan's nor:rl.nation at
the National Democratic Convention in Denver. Bryan's defeat probably
played a part in Francis' lack of success in an unofficial party
primary two years later when James A. Reed defeated him for nomina
tion to the Unitbd States Senate.

Francis' political career seemed to

have reached a dead end.
In 1916 the ambassadorship to Russia became vacant when George
Thomas Marye resigned.

Without question Francis was an outstanding

Democratic leader in lldssouri and a well-known statesman politician in
national political circles.

Ambassadorships were part of the politi

cal patronage of this era, and it was not uncommon for a politician to
be rewarded in this way.

Wilson especially seemed to have a penchant

for aclmowledging political favors of competent but not brilliant men
with diplomatic posts.

Francis' personal fortune probably �as a

10rattler, "The American Ambassador at Petrograd, 11 The Nation,
19 April 1917, p. 469.
l¾.ouis W. Koenig, Brya..'11: f! Political Biography Qi William
Jennings Bryan (New York: Putnam's, 1917), p. 410.

l2
factor as it would be needed to supplement his salary in the e.�pensive
capital of Russia.

These facts plus some abilities necessary for the

position placed Francis under consideration.

His administrative

abilities had been shown in the political offices he had held, in his
own com,'nission business, in his presidency of the St. Louis Inter
national Exposition of 1904 and in the working directorships he held
in a half dozen financial institutions in St. Louis. Wilson was most
desirous that a commercial treaty between the United States and Russia
be negotia·bed, and Francis I business acumen and experience suited him
well for that.
The Russian-American Col!lmercial Treaty of 183 2 with its most
favored nation clause was abrogated

by

Taft in 1912 because Russia

had refused to honor American passports when given to Jews.12 After
considerable public pressure, the House of Representatives passed a
joint resolution in December, 1911 to abrogate the treaty, and the
Russian ambassador in Washington had found the language of the resolu
tion so abusive that he threatened to return to Russia.

Congress

refused to alter the tone of the resolution so Taft issued an Executive
Order nullifying the treaty.
Samuel Harper, a Russian expert on the faculty of the University
of Chicago and an adviser to Francis, opined that Wilson chose Fra.'1.cis
for his well-known liberal tendencies. 13
12.rhomas A. Bailey, America Faces Russia (Ithaca: Cornell Univ.
Press, 1950), pp. 216-23.
13Paul V. Harper, ed., The Russia 1 Believe Jn: The Mer.1.oirs of
Samuel li• HarPer, 1902-12/d (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1945),
p. 91.
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Francis' personality was also an asset. He never forgot a face
A self-made man, he was vecy democratic even though he had

or a name.

dined with European sovereigns and met disti..�guished persons in both
hemispheres.

Francis conveyed a natural enthusiasm to others, and was

always ready for anything:

an address, a dinner or a card game. He

was an excellent storyteller and in demand as an after dinner
speaker. 14
Historically St. Petersburg was not considered

by

American poli

ticians to be one of the choicest diplomatic posts. For one thing the
friendship of the United States with Russia was based more on ttthe
adage that the enemies of our enemies are our friends--whether we like
them or not 11 , 15 than on a:ny bond of brotherhood.

Our two systems of

government uere incompatible and the peoples of the two countries saw
practically none of each other.

On the few occasions when the Un5.ted

States had had intimate relations with Russia, .!,.�., the arrival of
Russian ships in our northern ports during the Civil War, the purchase
of Alaska, the negotiating of a peace treaty after the Russo-Japanese
War, the Tsar had exploited us, but we had been satisfied with the
results.

In all of these international agreements, it was Presidents

and Secretaries of State who were primarily involved in the considera
tions, not the diplomats.
Another factor was the expensive social obligations which the
ministers incurred in the wealthy court society that flourished in
St. Petersburg.

Salaries were not commensurate with this type of

14n0ur Russian Ambassador Has Had a Strenuous Time,"� Literary
Digest, 29 December 1917, p. 85.
15J3ailey, p. 2.

entertaini..�g and a fortlll1e was helpful when stationed in the Russian
capital.

In some instances the Puritan sensibilities of the ambassa

dors were shocked by the opulence of the Russian society.
Russia was a very foreign place for Americans:

Also,

a strange mixture of

Byzantium and the Orient, a very difficult language although French
was used in official intercourse, and the tremendous distance from
Washington made cornnunication unbelievably slow.16 Finally, the
climate was very debilitating.

It was cold and damp with intermi

nably long winters, and St. Petersburg was surrounded by swampy land
with the accompanying flies and mosquitoes.
During the nineteenth century the tenure of our representatives
in St. Petersburg was usually short and the caliber of men was low.
In the early twentieth century none of the ambassadors to Russia had
brilliant records, but they had useful accomplishments on their
dosiers.

Robert Sanderson HcCorcick, ambassador from Decer:1.ber 1902

until 1907, had an excellent record.

It was due to his efforts that

the Associated Press was established in Russia, giving the world first
hand knowledge of Russian events. He also succeeded in obtaining from
the Russian Government recognition of passports granted by the United
States '!io her·Jewish citizens. The Tsar bestowed the Order of St.
Alexander Nevsky upon him 1n recognition of his service to Russia
during the Russo-Japanese War. This was a real tribute to his diplo
matic excellence for he handled the interests of Japan in Russia during
this time when the Russians believed the United States held pro
Japanese sentiments. He only resigned because the Russian climate had
16Bailey, pp. 45-46.

15
undermined his health. 17
Most of these men who served in the early twentieth century, like
John W. Riddle and William W. Rockhill, were career diplomats.

They

had studied abroad, were proficient in the Russian language, and had
several diplomatic posts under their belts. 18
George Thomas Marye, Francis' predecessor, was not a career
diplomat but he had studied abroad, knew international law, and served
as ambassador to France for a brief time. Marye arrived in Russia in
1914 when Russia was already heavily embroiled in World War I. He was
in charge of the diplomatic interests of both Germany and Austria
Hungary and in caring for the nationals of those countries who were
prisoners of war.

Tsar Nicholas II decorated him with the Order of

St. Alexander Nevsky and the Tsarina decorated his wife for her war
relief Wol"'k.

Marye also resigned ostensibly because of poor health

in February 1916.19

1711Robert Sanderson McCormick, u NCAB (1906), XIII, 375.
1811John W. Riddle," llQ!§ (194.3), XXX, 288 and 11William W.
Rockhill,"� (1900), VII, 129.
l9 11 George Thomas Marye," NCAB (194.3), XXX, 251.

•

I

II

Ambassador to Imperial.Russia
David Rowland Francis returned to his home in St. Louis, Missouri
from a business trip to New York City on February 15, 1916.

In going

through his mail the following day he found a letter which was to
change his life.
The letter was from Secretary of State Robert Lansing and offered
Francis the United States Am.bassadorship to Imperial Russia.

A fandly

conference of sons and daughters-in-law (Mrs. Francis was in Florida
and not present) was held; and with their good wishes and encourage
ment, Francis went to �-lashington to meet with President Wilson within
the week. The following day he accepted the post..

Russia accepted

him a week later, and the Senate met as a whole and approved his
appointment the first �eek of March.

On March 9, 1916 Francis took

the oath of office and returned home to have his commission framed and
hung in his den. 1
Thus, in less than a month, a cigar-smoking, poker-playing poli
tician from the mid-west with a successful business career behind him,
found himself the representative of the United States of America to the
Imperial Court of Emperor Nicholas II, Tsar of all the Russians.
President Wilson gave Francis one task as ambassador:

to nego

tiate a new commercial treaty with Russia. Francis favored such a
treaty and was eager to begin work. He saw the war as a great oppor
tunity for United States business interests to supplant the hold that
lnavid R. Francis' Appointment Book for 1916, David R. Francis
MSS, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, Missouri.
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Germany had on Russian Collll1lerce.

In a letter to Senator William J.

Stone on April 12, 1916, Francis -wrote of the opportunities the United
States had"• •• for the inv�stment of capital and for the exercise
of ingenuity and enterprise. n2
Francis felt the open antagonism to Russia by the Jews in this
country would not help his cause, a nd in his letter of April 12 to
Stone, he wrote,

11 •

•

•

•

Vb.en asked

by

them (prominent Jews at a

luncheon in New York Citi.J what they could do to aid me in the task I
have ••• I told them they could help me most by doing less talking.
Every expression by a Je"1 of antagonism to Russia makes the people of
the country less inclined to enter into close commercial relations
with the United States. 113 In a letter to Paul W. Brown, St. Louis
editor-in-chief of The Republic, on April 15, 1916, Francis wrote,
11

The Russians say the Jews sympathize with Germany in the war, and

that is an additional obstacle in the negotiating of a commercial

treaty. 114

Russia was also interested in closer relations with the United
States as evinced by a report to foreign governments by John Schwegel,
the Austro-Hungarian Consul at St. Louis, concerning Fra..�cis' interests •.
On

Hay 20, 1916 Schwegel wrote in part, ''He {!ranci� ..Jill also have to

devote himself to the much discussed question of the extension of
commercial relations with Russia, the discussion of which in the news
papers, in my opinion, is partly connected with Russia's desire to
2Francis, MSS •
.3Ibid.
4Ibid.
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open up the United States as a source of money, instead of squeezed
out France. 11 5
Francis' lmmvledge of Russia, by his own admission, was

11 •

•

•

that of the average intelligent American citizen--unbappily slight

and vague.n6 However, Francis did attempt to prepare himself for his
post. He met and had in his home for a -week-end a Professor Samuel N.
Harper, a noted pioneer in Russian studies at the University of
Chicago, who had visited Russia ten times in as many years and ·was
familiar -with the political and social conditions.
Harper was the protege of Charles R. Crane, a wealthy businessman
and traveler in the Slavic and Oriental countries, who had become a
cl9se adviser to Wilson on foreign policy especially in regard to
Russia.

Crane had turned down the post of ambassador to Imperial

Russia in 1913 beca use of' the press of business affairs after his
father's death. 7 His numerous visits to Russia had produced many
friendships among the liberal intellectuals. These visits had also
produced a keen interest in Russia and things Russian, and Crane had
encouraged young Harper to become an expert in this field.

Crane had

introduced Harper to many of his Russian friends and inculcated in
Harper his own abiding devotion to the Russian people.8
For all of these reasons Crane wanted to take precautions to
5Francis , 1'13S.
6navid Rowland Francis, Russia from the American Embassy:
1916-Nove:r.i.ber, 1918 (New York: Scribner's, 1921), p • .3.
7 11 charles R. Crane," liQ.@ (1943), XXX, 221.

8Christopher Lasch, The American Liberals and the Russian
Revolution (Ne\! York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1962), p. 6.
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ensure the success of Francis' mission, and he encouraged Harper to go
v1ith the new ambassador to keep an eye on him.9 There were concerns
in the State Department also about a comely, middle-aged lady,
Mathilde de Cram, who had made inquiries concerning which boat Francis
v1as sailing on and made arrangements to be on the same one.

She was

on the list of suspected German agents primarily because of some of
her husband's business associations with Germans, but also, her
traveling companion to the United States in 1915 had been a Russian
woman who was later prosecuted for revealing state secrets to the
Germans.lo

When Francis learned Harper had planned a trip to Russia duri.ng
the summer of 1916, he suggested Harper go over with him early in the
spring. After considerable haggling with the University of Chicago,
Harper was able to arrange for his classes and their examinations,
and to accompany Francis on the Swedish liner Oscar II in April.
Harper lectured Francis on shipboard each day about the situation he
would find in Russia. 11 Harper had no difficulty in keeping Francis
a�ay from Mathilde de Cram on the voyage. They merely exchanged
greetings as the lady was not a good sailor and was confined to her
cabin most of the trip. She did manage to be on Francis' train from
Stockholm to Petrograd, however, and cultivated his friendship then.
Francis assured Harper later that the rumors she was a spy were false. 12
9Harper, p. 96.
lOGeorge F. Kennan, Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920: Russia,
Leaves the lli!! (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1956), pp. 38-J9.
llHarper, pp. 91-92.
12Ibid., p. 9
4.
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Harper remained in Russia until August, 1916 and saw Francis
frequently. Francis wrote in his diary of their dining together on

May first and of the confidence he had in Harper.13 Harper found

Fre.ncis to be a charming old gentleman. He commented that Francis was
a very gregarious person and took every opportunity on shipboard to
talk ·with anyone about Russia. He also was pleased to find Francis to
be"• •• a very blunt outspoken American, who believed in speaking

his mind regardless of diplomacy. 11 14

In Francis' bookcase were books recommended by Professor Harper
including Sonia Howe's! Thousand Years of Russian History, Bernard
Pares' Russia and Reform and Paul Miliukov's The Russian Crisis.15
Hrs. Frencis did not accompany her husband to Russia because it
was felt her health could not withstand the rigors ef the Russian
olimate.
David Rowland Francis arrived at the Finland Station in Petrograd
at two o'clock on the cold, dark morning of April 28, 1916. The train
was three hours late .. With Philip Jordan, his faithful black valet
and butler, by his side Francis was warmly welcomed by the entire
Embassy starr. 16 Thus began his duties as the representative of the
most democratic nation of the new world to the most autocratic nation
lJFranci s, MSS.
l¼arper, p. 93.
15This list of books is among the David R. Francis MSS, Vdssouri
Historical Society, St. Louis, Missouri. The other books on the list
are Maurice Barins' The Mainsprings of Russia and The Russian People;
Sir David M. Wallace's Russia; and Harold H. Williams' Russia of�
Russians.
1t>rrancis, Russia from the American EmbassI, p. .
J
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of the old.
Francis was

by

nature a very sociable_person. His Russian

appointment book for 1916 shows frequent dates for dinner; golf,
bridge and the races. 17 He received much satisfaction from enter
taining

and

had official dinner parties and receptions two or three

times a week. Soon after his arrival he gave the first of a number of
teas for the American colony in Petrograd.

For many A.�ericans,

it was their first realization of how many of their countrymen were in
the capital city of Russia.18 His valet, Philip Jordan, was also
something of a cook, and aided Francis i:m.�easurably in his enter
taining of Americans, for he taught the Russian chef hovt to make corn
bread and Southern biscuits.19
HowevE;r, Francis' personal taste and habits were ill-suited for
this diplomatic post. His legendary prowess at poker, and his 11 unerr
ing ability to hit a spittoon at ten paces 11 20 were not assets in
continental diplomatic society. His colleagues tended to either
ignore him or to view him with mild arusement. Francis vas equally
a�kward with his career associates for they, naturally enough, were
far more familiar with diplomatic life, especially that of Petro
grad than he.

It was difficult for such a rugged individualist to

s�allow his pride and seek the advice of others and to accept their
17Francis, I--lSS.

1�rancis, Russia from the American Embassy, p. ll.

19i.1rs. Clinton A. Bliss, "Philip Jordan's Letters from Russia,
1917-1919, 11 Bulletin of the Missouri Historical Societ;y, January, 1958,
p. 14.3.
2<\obert D. Warth The All.i� and the Russian Revolution (Durham:
�
Duke Univ. Press, 1954J, p. JO.
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opinions.21
Francis' continued friendship with Mat)?.ilde de Cram was also a
source of embarrassment and gossip for the Diplomatic Corps since this
intelligent woman was on the books of the Russian counter-intelligence
as a suspected German agent.

She frequently joined Francis for noc

turnal walks which were his custom after a long working day, and she
visited Francis at the Embassy where she gave him French lessons.
These visits to the ambassador's living quarters caused the most con
cern because they were in close proximity to the Embassy's code and
file room. There was no proof of the charges that she was a German
agent nor was there any evidence that their relationship went beyond
the bounds of propriety. 22
These problems did not prevent Francis fron performing his duties
ably in the arena of administration and commerce. His keen business
mind told him that Russia would be a good source of trade for the
United States after the war. Even now great quantities of American ,.iar
supplies and other goods were entering Russia through the ports at
Arch&--igel and Vladivostok. This had been abetted by a twelve million
dollar trade credit made to the Russian government

by

the J. P. Morgan

Company in January 1915. While President Wilson condemned outright
loans to the Russian government, he unofficially condoned, if not
encouraged, these short-term ban..kers 1 credits. 23 Then, too, there was
projected the first American bank in Russia with branches in
21Kennan, Russia Leaves the
22Ibid., 38.

l!fil:,

pp. 39-40.

23Arthur s. Lin.le, Wilson: The Struggle fQr Neutrality (Princeton:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1960), p. 136.
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Petrograd

and Hoscow. 24

These situations plus Wilson 1 s directive to negotiate a new
commercial treaty explain Francis' interest in seeking out the Russian
Minister of Foreign Affairs immediately.

On the day of his arrival,

he made an appointment for the following day with Sergei Sazonov.
This meeting -was quite a disappointment to Fra,.,cis for he learned the
Russian Government �as no longer eager for such a treaty.

Sazonov

explained that the Allies had agreed among themselves, without
consulting Russia, bow the war was to be prosecuted and how commerce
was to be carried on after the war.

He declared that until Russia

could meet with the Allies and have these aims more clearly defined,

she would not negotiate a treaty with any one of them.25 Francis

continued to call on Sazonov frequently, and they became friends in
spite of Sazonov 1 s refusal to consider a treaty with the United
States.
The Allied Economic Council was to meet in Paris early in the
summer, and Francis hoped differences between Russia and the Allies
could be reconciled by July.

Then the way would again be clear to

negotiate a treaty .26 Fra,,cis continued to work diligently for
economic agreements between the United States and Russia to the point
where he was chastised

by

the Secretary of State.

Notwithstanding Sazonov's statement that Russia would not nego
tiate any commercial treaties, there was a secret treaty made with
.. / Czars and Presidents (New York:
24Alexandre Tarsaidze,
Oblensky, 1958), p • .350.

25Francis, Russia fro� the American Embassy, pp. 8, 9.

2t>.rarsaidzt, p • .350.

McDowell,

Japan that summer.

In addition to the rebuff of the treaty's being

negotiated, there were implications that t�e treaty was against the
United States. Francis cabled Secretary La�sing that Sazonov had
assured him of Russia's friendship and that the treaty had no implica. tions for the United States.

However, the State Depart:nent wanted the

Japanese and Russian Governments to officially affirm their peaceful
intentions which they did. 27
Two months after Francis' arrival in Russia, he bade Sazonov
farewell as the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs left for a vaca
tion in Finland.

The vacation became a political matter as Sazonov

resigned while away.
Francis felt he waA not fully acknowledged as the Ambassador until
he had been received by the Tsar, and arrangements for such a recep
tion were made less than two weeks after his arrival. 28 Francis
called on the Master of Ceremonies and the Histress of the Imperial
Court in Petrograd

on Hay fourth to learn the protocol, and on

the following day, he and his staff traveled by train to the Emperor's
Station near Tsarskoe Selo. There they were met by the Master of
Ceremonies and his staff, dressed in gorgeous uniforms, and escorted
the half-mile to Tsarskoe Sela in gilded chariots drawn by handsome
steeds.
At the Palace they were met by numerous uniformed guards, and
Francis was conducted to the Emperor who welcomed him with a hand
shake. They sat and talked for thirty-five minutes and FraJ1cis told
27Pauline T ompkins, American-Russian Relat;ons
(New York: Macmillan, 1949), p. 47.

111

the��

28rrancis, Russia .£!:2B the American Embassy, pp. 12-17.
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Nicholas of his desire to negotiate a new commercial treaty.

In a

letter to Secretary Polk, Francis reported that the Emperor then
"smiled a.l'ld said that Russia was equally desirous to have a new
treaty, and trusted there would be no difficulty in obtaining one.
(As I later learned this was a very characteristic at.titude.

This

�nfortunate monarch was always trying to avoid difficulties). n .29
Francis then met with the Empress alone.

He found her so gra

cious and j_nteresting, he could not recall her royal attire when asked
about it later by his staff.
Until the United States severed diplomatic relations with Germany
in February, 1917, Francis, as the representative of the chief neutral
country, represented German and Austrian interests in Russia.

Among

· Francis' duties was the supervision of the care of a million and a
half prisoners of war interred in Russia and over three hundred fifty
thousand aliens interned in the provinces.

There were many com

plaints about conditions in the prison camps, and Francis sent inspec
tors around who reported to him.

This task took much of his time, and

he found it a disagreeable responsibility.JO
Fra.�cis detected strong German influence everywhere in Russia.
• There were spies in every department of the Imperial Government,
especially the military.

Even the loyalty of the Gernan-born Empress

was not above suspicion.

He found Germany had a very favorable connner

cial treaty with Russia which would expire in 1916, and that the war
29Francis, Russia from the American Embassy. p.

14.

30i3olshevik Propaga.YJ.da. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 65th Congress.
February 11, 1919 to March 10, 1919. (Washington: GPO, 1919), p. 937.
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ha.d not cost Germany her control of many of the commercial industries
in Russia such as sugar, glass, and power.

Even the sale of American

manufactured goods was made through German commercial outlets. 3 1
In September 1916 Francis made another attempt to promote com
merce and better understanding between the United States and Russia.
He proposed a telegraph be laid to connect the two countries� The
cost of such a project was estimated to be about six million dollars,
and Russian officials immediately offered to advance half the money.
11

But our government, 11 wrote Francis, "declined participation on the

grounds that it could not engage in a business enterprise. 1132
On

March 7, 1917 Francis gave a dinner for Baron and Baroness

Uchida, the new Japanese ambassador and his wife, which the Russian
Imperial Cabinet attended.

During the evening the company had made

jokes about the recent strikes and demonstrations in the working
class districts of Petrograd and they received Francis' words that
they reach home safely as a 11 conversational pleasantry. 11 Thus the
departing guests were somewhat ta.ken aback when the massive doors of
the Embassy opened.

In the distance they could see a faint red glow

which increased in intensity as they watched.
official party the Tsar 1 s ministers attended.33

31Bolshevik Propaganda 1 p. 937.
32rarsaidz�, p. 350.
33Ibid. �- p; ·352 •.

It was the last
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Ambassador to the Provisional Government
Time had indeed run out for the Romanov dynasty. \-Jhen the storm
of Revolution broke on Harch eighth with strikes and demonstrations
and clashes with the police, Francis found himself and the Embassy in
the midst of the turmoil.

No. 34 Furshtatskaya was situated in a

fashionable section, lying between the center of the city \.!here the
Provisional Government would meet in the Marensky Palace and the
Tauride district where the Bolshevik headquarters would later be in the
Smolny Institute.

This position gave Francis a grandstand view of the

stree t fighting and the crowds that throng ed the Liteiny Prospekt.
When Ambassador Francis heard of Nicholas' abdication on Harch fif
teenth, he was pleased.

Francis was very much aware of the onerousness

of the Empire, and along with the Russian people, was weary of it.

In

addition to these personal feelings, there were political realities
that were pleasing to Francis.

Russia seemed to be following the

example of the Unite'd States in having renounced the institut ion of
monarchy and now embarking on the road to a democratic form of govern
ment.

This would imply that the United States and the American

ambassador 1-1ould have the most to offer and the most to say to the new
Russian government.

This particularly appealed to Francis as he had

been miffed by the Brit ish and French overshadowing him in relations
wit h the Russian Court.l
Three days later, Francis called on his friend and occasional
lxennan, Russia Leaves the 1lar, pp. 18-19.
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dinner companion, Michael Rodzianko, whovtas now President of the Duma
and

the chairman of the committee which appointed the ministers of the

Provisional Government.

Francis wanted to ascertain the principles on

which this government was founded and the stability of this new
regime. 2 Rodzianko refer:red Francis to another acquaintance, Paul
Miliukov, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Miliukov convinced

Francis the Provisional Government was founded on the same principles
as those of the United States.

After talking with him, Fre,ncis felt

confident that the Lvov cabinet would honor Russia's commitment to the
war and he exultantly cabled the United States government:
This is official information obtained by my personal unofficial
calls to-day on Rodzianko at his residence and H:i.liukoff, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, at his office. There is n o opposition to the Pro
visional Government, which is a Council of Hinisters, appointed by a
Cor.imittee of Twelve named by the Dwna. Quiet prevails here and
throughout Russia as far as known. Rodzianko and Miliukoff both
assure me that the entire A:rmy accepts the authority of the Provi
sional Government and all appearances and advices confirm the samz •
• • • The plan of the Provisional Government is to call a Constituent
Assembly or convention whose members will be elected by the vihole
people and empowered to organize a goverilli1ent. Whether that will be a
republic or a constitutional monarch is not decided but the conclu
sions of the Assembly will be accepted universally and enforced b-J the
army and navy. • • • I request respectfully that you pro,:ptly g:i. ve me
authority to recognize the Provisional Government, as the first recog
nition is desirable from every viewpoint. This revolution is the
practical realization of that principle of government which we have
championed and advocated--I mean government by the consent of the
governed. Our reco gnition will have a stupendous moral effect
especially if given first. Rodzianko and Niliukoff both assure me the
Provisional Government will vigorously prosecute the war • • • • 3
Two days later Francis received the necessary authority from the
State Department, and at four o'clock on the afternoon of March 22,
1917, he nrustered his staff and marched to the Marensky Palace where
2Francis, Russia from the American Embassy, pp. 82-84.

1fil

3Papers Relating .t:Q the Foreign Relations of the United States,
(Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1926), p. 1205.
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the Provisional Government was assembled.

The Ambassador and his

entourage were received by the Council of Ministers, and after
Miliukov introduced them, Francis announced:
Hr. President of the Council of Ministers, I have the honor as
American ambassador and as representative of the Government of the
United States, accredited to Russia, to state in accordance with my
instructions that the Government of the United States recognizes the
new Government of Russia a.Dd that I, as Ambassador of the United
States will be pleased to continue intercourse with Russia through
the medium of the new Government. May the cordial relations existing
between the two countries continue to obtain, and may they prove
mutually satisfactory and beneficial. 4
Paul Miliukov, the ne-w Foreign Minister, had, while in exile in
the United States a few years before, filled the chair of Slavonic
History and Literature -which Charles R. Cra.."'le had established. He
was a respected historian and had given a lecture for the Civic
Forum in New York recently. His statements concerning Russia's
honoring her cormnitment to remain in the war ,Jere very reassuring,
as were his statements about commercial relations with the
United States.

In an intervie,.r -with the Associated Presa in Petro

grad, he conunented,

11

Nothing now stands in the way of a new

commercial treaty between Russia and the United States.

I think I am

right in saying that the United States is eager for the resumption of
old commercial relations and for the removal of all the disabilities
governing Jews here. n5 This intervie,-t reinforced Francis I hopes that;
this essentially bourgeois Provisional Government would neeotiate a
commercial treaty with the United States. He had a treaty prepared by
the end of the sumner, but the ever-changing character of the govern4Foreign Relations, 1917, p. 1211.
5 11 Der.1.ocratic Russia As Our Ally," The Literary Diges� • .31 March
1917, pp. 885-87.
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ment made it questionable who should sign it.6
Already, however, there were signs all was not going well in
Russia.

While the Provisional Government was takL.1g over the reins of

government, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies,
made up of Socialist Revolutionaries, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, was
also gaining in strength.

Francis was aware of this, but not of how

much influence this group would have.

"The Workingman's party have

been joined by some soldiers, 11 he wrote Madden Summers, Consul
General at Moscow, on March sixteenth,
I don't know how many, and they have a co!TII'llttee called 11 Comrnittee of
Workingmen 1 s Party and Soldiers' Deputies 11 ; this committee has issued
a number of proclamations-I think several daily--a�d these pronunci
atmentos have been filled with rot. That organization demands a
republic • • • • The Duma party favors a vigorous prosecution of the
war, but the utterances of the Workingmen and Soldiers' Deputies
Com.:rl.ttee declare in favor of concerted action on the part of the
proletariat of the belligerent countries in putting an end to a war
which they say is waged in the interest of capital at the expense of
labor and the laboring class. 7
These rumblings from the soviets were overshadowed by the news
that the United States had declared war on Germany.
receipt

by

11

I am just in

cable, 11 Francis wrote to Hiliukov

of the following noble sentiment expressed by President Wilson in his
address to Congress delivered the evening of April 2nd to the two
houses in joint session.
A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a
p artnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be
trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants.
Does not every American feel that assura...1ce has been added to our
hope for the future peace of the world by the wonderful and heartening
things that have been happening within the last few weeks in Russia?
Russia was known by those who knew her best to have been always in
fact democratic at heart, in all the vital habits of her thought, in
all the intimate relationships of her people that spoke their natural
611our Russian Ambassador Has Had A Strenuous Time, 11 p. 82.
7
Francis, Russia fro_E the American Embassy. p. 71.
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instinct, their habitual attitude towards life. The autocracy that
crowned the summit of her political structure long as it had stood and
terrible as was the reality of its power, was not in fact Russian in
origin, character or purpose, and now it has been shaken off and the
great generous Russian people have been added in all their native
majesty and might to the forces that are fighting for freedom in the
world, for justice and peace. Here is a fit partner for a league of
honor.
I thought this would be of interest to you, a.nd hasten to commun
icate it. In my judgment it is not only thrilling and i�pressive but
should be an inspiration to the Russian people and prompt them to a
patriotic support of the Government which you and your Colleagues are
so ably and faithfully administering. 8
All Russians were not supporting the Provisional Government, yet
Francis remained @Ptimistic and confident even in the face of ominous
events as shown

by

his cable to Washington on April 21, 1917.

11

Extreme

socialist or anarchist named Lenin making violent speeches and thereby
strengthening government; designedly giving him leeway and will deport

opportunely. 11 9

The Social Revolutionaries, who were non-Marxian socialists,
spawned several terrorist groups.

One such group was identifed

by

non

Russians in Petrograd as the anarchists. To the .Alooricans in Petrograd
these anarchists seemed to have t1,,10 major planks in their platfom:
one, to denounce the Bolshevlks for not using terrorist methods; the
other, to denounce the United States for her treatment of anarchists.
Their headquarters in Petrograd was a garage about three and a half
blocks from the American Embassy.lo The anarchists threatened the
American Embassy and the Ambassador on many occasions. The first
8yrancis, Russia from the American Embassy, pp. 96-97.

9Foster Rhea Dulles, The Road 1Q Teheran (Princeton: Princeton
Univ. Press, 19/44), p. 101.
1C\.Iilliam Hard, Raymond Robins I Own Stor;z (1920; rpt. New York:
Arno Press & The New York Times, 197If,' p. 73.
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series of these occurred in May of 1917.

The anarchists presented

Francis with resolutions threatening to harm him if Alexander Berkman
and Emma Goldman were not released.
Berkman, who was a Russian immigrant to the United States was the
editor of Blast, an anarchist publication. He had served a prison
term for wounding Henry Clay Frick during the Homestead Strike in
1892, and was presently in jail for agitation against the conscription
law.11 Emma. Goldman was also a Russian immigrant and had enjoyed a

flamboyant career as an anarchist lecturer and founder of the radical
Mother Earth magazine.
draft law.

She was in prison now for speaking against the

She and Berkman were finally deported to Russia in 1919.12

One afternoon in early May Francis was talking with Lincoln
Steffens at the Embassy when they heard a mob outside, chanting,
11111.mil

Muni! 11 Mystified, the t·wo men learned from Bill (William G.)

S hepherd,

a United

Press war correspondent, that the crowd was pro

testing the conviction of Tom Mooney for being an accessory before the
throwing of a bomb during a Preparedness Day Parade in San Francisco.
Several people had been killed and many more had been wounded in the
San Francisco fracas; and the radical labor leader had been sentenced
to death.13 Shortly the crowd broke up and moved on down the street.
A few nights afterwards Francis entertained five guests at a late
supper after a ballet performance. A servant brought him the telephone
.Q.iim

D-nonald Drew Egbert and Stow Persons, eds., Socialism and Ameri
L,lli (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1952), I, 239B•

12Richard Drinnon, Rebel .ill Paradise (Chicago:
Press, 1961), pp. 96, 188, 223.

Univ. of Chicago

13Lincoln Steffens, Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens (Uew York:
Harcourt Brace, 1931), pp. 747-/42.
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message that a mob was forming on Nevsky Prospect to attack the
Embassy, and within minutes a call from the police confirmed that a
mob was en route.

Francis requested Phil Jordan to fetch his loaded

pistol, and so armed, he escorted his guests to the door.

Seven

Russian soldiers were in the vestibule and thirty more with fixed
bayonets were outside on the sidewalk ready to defend the Embassy.
Francis told them,

11

I am the American ambassador.

If a man crosses

that threshold without ray consent and you do not shoot him, I will. I
have a loaded pistol here in

my

pocket. 11 14 A few minutes later word

came that the mob had been broken up

by

a band of Cossacks.

Rumor had

it that Lenin had incited the mob by telling them that their fellow

Socialist, Mooney, was to be hanged in America.15

The Mooney case became notorious on the international scene
because there was evidence of perjured testimony and a frame-up by the
prosecution.

There were demonstrations by labor and radicals in many

large cities around the world.· The situation in Petrograd became such
that Francis ,tired the United States government not to let any consid
eration for his safety interfere with the course of the law.16 On
May 11, 1917 Woodrow Wilson wired Governor William D. Stephens of
California:

"I hope that in vie-w of certain international aspects

which the case has assumed you will not deem me impertinent or beyond
my rights if I very warmly and earnestly urge upon you the wisdom and
desirability.of commuting the sentence of Mooney or at\least suspending
14Bolshev.i.k Pro£aganda, pp. 961-62.

l5Ibid., p. 962.
16Ibid.
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its execution until the charges of perjury lodged against the witnesses
in the case are judicially probed to the bottom. Such an action on
your part would I can assure you have the widest and most beneficial
results and greatly relieve some critical situations outside the United
States.1117 Stephens informed the President he had stayed Mooney's

sentence indefinitely while his appeal was pending in the California
Supreme Court. Wilson replied on Hay
serious anxiety."18

14,

11

It relieves a rather

Francis established and maintained close official contact with
the Provisional Government for the next eight months. He agreed with
and carried·out the policy of the United States that this Russian
experiment in democracy should be nurtured and that the fighting
effectiveness of the Russian armed forces should be restored. The
problems that Russia was having were not seen by the foreign diploma
tic representatives in Russia.

They brought standards of political

right and wrong from their western experience and applied these to
Russia with its quite different political tradition. They were not in
touch with the masses and could not conceive of the revolutionary
ideas which were promulgated

by

the Bolsheviks.

Bruce Lockhart, the

unofficial British representative in Russia and one of the few
Europeans really knowledgeable about Russia, wrote in his diary that
11

01d Francis doesn't know a Left Social-Revolutionary from a potato. 11 19

17Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters (New York:
Doubleday, Doran, 1939), VII, 65-66.
18Eaker, Woodrow Wilson, VII, 66.
19R. H. Bruce Lockhart, British Agent (New York:
p. 2:79.

Putnam's, 19 33),
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Lincoln Steffens and Raymond Robins both encouraged Francis to go out
into the streets and talk with the people, but Francis' reply was that
he had his orders from the State Department not to make any contact
with the radical leftist groups.
Lincoln Steffens was one of the few Americans who sensed a dif
ferent Russia than the one the press and diplomats were reporting. He
wrote to his sister, Laura, on Ma.y 6, 1917 from Petrograd, "Living is
high, uncomfortable, and uneasy, but it is all as one would expect
under the conditions•••• Of the revolution here all I need sey for
the present is that it is a real one.

.

.

• It is not all over yet.

There are intense issues to be fought out and the fight is on.

I don't

mean only the recent street demonstrations. They are mere surface
indications of the economic struggle going on below. The sense of the
war risks at the front door here both helps and hinders the expression
of the conflict of class purposes, but out they must come. 11 20
For the Americans, there was also the false expectation that the
Russian democracy would be a replica of the American model.

Ambassador

Francis shared and expressed this view in a letter to his son after the
first reorganization of the Provisional Government in Ha.y 1917.

11

1

have not lost faith in Russia coming out of this ordeal as a republic
and with a government which will be founded on correct principles. 11 21
Baron Rosen, former Russian ambassador to the United States,
realized that the Government of the United States had been misled
about the real state of affairs in Russia and the real feelings of the
20tincoln Steffens, The Letters of Lincoln Steffens (New York:
Harcourt, Brace, 1938), I, 398-99.
21x>eter G. Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment (Cambridge:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1967), p. 16.
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Russian people.

This was due to war propaganda and to the trust the

Allied diplomats including Francis had in the Russian press as the only
reliable source of information on Russian affairs and party leeders.22
By the middle of April rumors that Russia was going to make a
separate peace with Germany were prevalent. The big fear the Allies
had was that Russia would pull out of the War and enable the German
armies to concentrate all their power against the Western Front.
Francis had helped to get loans, which were to total three hundred
twenty-five million dollars, from the United States to prop up the

Provisional Government as long as Russia stayed in the ,�ar.23 Thus
Francis felt he was somewhat responsible for Russia's remaining in the
war, and in a letter to his eldest son, wrote, "I realize the magni
tude of my responsibility but at the sarJe time feel fortunate that it
has fallen to nzy- lot to play such an important part in occurrences
which are determining not only the future of our country and of Russia
but of all international relations and in fact of society itselr. 11 24
Woodrow Wilson, ho,�ever, did not see Francis I lot this way.
11

Wilson," according to George F. Kennan, 11 was largely his own Secre

tary of State insofar as the fornmlation of policy on major questions
was concerned," and "shared with many other American statesmen a dis
inclination to use the network of America's foreign diplomtic
missions as a .vital and intimate agency of policy • • • • in rare
22Baron Rosen, Forty Years of Diplomacy (New York: Knopf, 1922),
II, 237.
23Robert Goldston, The Russian Revolution (Greenwich: Fawcett
Publications, 1966), p. 121.
24Francis, Russia from the American Embassz. p. 125.
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instances where this was done, it was mainly an irregular agent,
Colonel Edward M. House, and not the permanent envoys, whose services
Yere employed.

In general, the President's taste in diplotla.cy ran

rather to the direct appeal to foreign opinion, for which .American
diploma.tic representatives were not required. 11 25 So it was only
natural that ·when many people began urging Wilson to show the Russian
people the United States was sympathetic to their situation and wanted
to aid the Russians in any way she could, that_he decided to appoint
a diplomatic mission extraordinary.

Its purposes, according to the

cable Lansing sent to Francis were
to convey to the Russian government the friendship and good will of
this nation and to express the confident hope that the Russian
people, having developed a political system founded on the principle
of democracy, will join with the free people of America in resisting
with firmness and fortitude the ambitions of the German Government
which by force, intrigue, and deception they are striving to attain.
The comn:i.ssion will further be charged with the duty of finding the
most efficient means of cooperating with the Russian Government in
the prosecution of the war �ith the united purpose of accomplishing
the overthrow of military autgcracy, which menaces human liberty and
all democratic institutions.2
The men chosen for the comnussion are an interesting study in
therr�elves.

Ex-Secretary of State Elihu Root, a leading Republican

statesman and foreign policy expert, was chairman of the group.

The

other members were Yiajor-General Hugh L. Scott, representing the Army;
Rear-Admiral James H. Gleason, an ordnance expert, representing the
Navy; Dr. John R. Mott, a YNCA leader; Charles R. Crane, an industria
list who had some experience in Russia; Cyrus McCormick, whose Harvester
Company had wide interests and a plant in Russia; Samuel R. Bartron, a
25Kenne.n, Russia Leaves the War, pp. 28-29.
26roreign Relations, 1917, Supp. 2, II, 51.
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prominent banker; Charles Edward Russell, a Socialist writer; and
James Duncan, the first vice-president of the American Federation of
Labor.

None of the men represented even a liberal stance.

The

Socialist writer and one-time Socialist candidate for President,
Charles Edward Russell, was pro-war and -was expelled from the
Socialist Party when he accepted the appointment.

The labor leader,

James Duncan, was hardly acceptable to the Russian Socialists.

Not

one of these men was an expert on Russia, only one (Crane) could even
speak or understand the Russian language.

It is equally interesting

to note that Eugene Heyer, a Jew, was asked to serve.

He accepted the

appo:i.ntment but was later asked to withdraw because of the strong

feelings against the Jews in Russia.27

On June fourteenth the Root Commission began its three week
social and business whirl in troubled Petrograd.

The following day

Francis introduced the Commission to the J:ftlnistry of the Provisional
Government with some of his famous "Fourth of July 11 oratory which -was
received courteously enough except for a fe'W furtive glances when he

stated that there were no classes in America.28

Other speeches were

equally platitudinous but one Russian minister, obviously perturbed by
the rhetoric, exclaimed to the Russian naval aide assigned to the
mission, "Young man, will you please tell these Americans that we are
tired of this war.

Explain to them we are weary of this bloody

struggle. u 29 The aide was visibly shaken by such audacity and would
27Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VII, 61-62, 62,B.
28
warth, p. 102.
29
Ibid. , pp,. . l0J-04 .,
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not translate the remarks. The Commission probably would not have
believed that these were the views of most Russians anyway. They came
�ith their o\m preconceived ideas of the situation in Russia, and
these ideas were confirmed as they met only their counterparts in
Russian society.
Russell was the only member of the Mission to recognize that the
Petrograd Soviet was important enough to attend one of its meetings.
He made a patriotic address there, and one Soviet member responded
with a sharp rebuttal which was sofiened in translation so as not to
be offensive.JO Russell alone became aware that the Soviet and the
Provisional Government were struggling with each other for mastery of
the situation, and he believed the So·r.i.et had the power to win.JI
The conclusion of the Commission was th�.t propaganda was the only
way to reach the people. They reconunended to the State Department
that one hundred thousand dollars be appropriated now and up to five
million dollars be appropriated later for posters, leaflets, pamphlets,
lecturers, and motion pictures presenting the Allied cause.

Francis

joined Root in successfully urging a credit of seventy-five million
dollars to take care of the Russian Baltic Fleet where the sailors had
not been paid in months.32
In addition to the Root Commission, Francis recommended that the
Wilson Administration send a railway commission to Russia. The rail
system there was a shambles as a result of the war., inefficient organi.3<\1arth, p. 104 •

.311asch, p.

41.

32Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root (New York:
.364-67.

Dodd, Mead, 1938), II,
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zation, outmoded methods of operation and lack of equipment.

The

Trans-Siberian Railroad had almost ceased to function and there was a
consequent pile-up of needed American supplies at Vladivostok.

When

the .Americans arrived at Vladivostok in June 1917 to begin their
operations, Francis sent a letter of greeting to John F. Stevens, an
eminent engineer and chairman of the group,
I Has more than pleased when advised by the State Department that you
had been designated to come to Russia as the head of a commission of
experts whose mission is to relieve the congestion at Vladivostok and
to improve generally the transportation facilities of the Siberian
Railway. My understanding is that you will be given absolute control
at Vladivostok, and I hope to have that control extended throughout
the entire length of the Siberian railway. I have not asked the
latter at this time because it is impolitic to do so. The railroad
engeneers of Russia are highly educated men and claim to be exceedingly
practical. They are jealous to a degree of any reflection upon their
ability and qualifications, and consequently they must be handled
diplomatically as I know you are capable of doing.33
During the summer of 1917 Fra,..cis maintained his optL-nism in
Russia's future.

Events such as the Bolshevik demonstrations on July

16-18 which were suppressed in spite of the new Army regulations, cer
tainly encouraged his confidence in the Government. 34 After this
unsuccessful uprising by some Petrograd workers, soldiers and Kron
stadt sailors, Francis felt Kerensky made a big mistake by not
imprisoning both Lenin and Trotsky for treasonable activities.
went so far as to express his views to Tereshchenko:

11

He

That the only

logical course for the government to pursue was to execute Lenin and
Trotsky for treason. 11 35

Instead Lenin escaped and went into hiding,

and while Trotsky was arrested, he was released soon afterwards.
33Fra.�cis, Russia froE the American Embassy, pp. 130-3 1.
34Bolshevi�

Propaganda, p. 940.

35schuman, p. 50.
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Francis even found reason to be cheerful when the Russian summer
offensive, successful at first, began to falter and broke into a rout.
The Springfield Renublican of July 28, 1917 quoted one of his reports:
11

Defeat had strengthened the hands of the government by creating a

universal demand for stronger discipline. 036
By fall the situation in Petrograd was deteriorating rapidly;
demonstrations were frequent, and as Francis said in a dispatch to
Lansing:

11

Food is very difficult to procure here now and is commanding

exorbitant figures; in front of the Embassy I counted to-day about 200
people in a bread line, many of whom after waiting four to six hours
were told the supply was exhausted.

This is one of many such in every

section of the city.n.37 Philip Jordan wrote Mrs. Francis that a shiP
load of American food was eagerly awaited. He commented that the

report of Francis' being blown up by a bomb was false, but added it
could happen.

11

Some days and nights, 11 he wrote,

11

you will see on the

Nevsky Prespect ten or twenty thousand marching with black flags and
banners reading we are on our wa:y to kill all Americans and all rich
people--that includes me and �yon� who has on a white shirt. n.38
To reassure her he added that Francis loaded his pistol whenever the
Bolsheviks came.
By September there was growing dissatisfaction among the Russian
people with Kerensky as he had neither laid out any progra,�$ nor made
any new declarations since l'-fa.y.

Public opinion was rising against the

36Lasch, p. 45.
37Francis, Russia from the American Embassy, p. 165.
3�1iss, pp. 142-43.
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the way the government had been conducted and against the radical
cabinets '1-thich had talked much but done little.

Into this situation

appeared the Cossack general, Lavr Kornilov, with pronise of conserva
tive, military leadership.

The British and French were in favor of

supporting Kornilov who wanted to re-establish discipline in the army
and law and order in the country.

Woodrow Wilson had a firm policy

that the United States was not to interfere in the internal affairs of
the Provisional Government. Fra.."lcis not only did not deviate from that
policy but also persuaded the other ambassadors to publicize a neutral
viewpoint.

He argued 11 that should Korniloff be successful it would

not mean a restoration of the Monarchy, but merely a new administra
tion and a

more vigorous prosecution of the war.

If, on the other

hand, • • • Russia should be forced out of the war through Kerensky's
failure to restore discipline in the army, the Allied diplomats would
receive and deserve severe censure for having aided Kerensky to elimi
nate Korniloff.

If, on the contrary, we were to support Korniloff

and he should fail we would obviously find ourselves in an impossible

situation with relation to the Kerensky Government. 11 39

After the suppression of the Kornilov revolt, the British, French
and Italian ambassadors called on Prime Minister Kerensky insisting
that military discipline be restored in the lu:rrry, but Francis followed
Wilson's directive and did not join them. The Provisional Government
expressed its appreciation to Secretary.of State Lansing. 40 On Octo
ber ninth the chief Allied Ambassadors, with Francis again abstaining,
39Francis, Russia f.:!:2ill the American Embassy, pp. 157-58.
40i:1ax M. Laserson, The American Impac) ill! Russia: 1784-1917
(1950; rpt. New York: Collier l3ooks, 1962, pp. 49'7-98.
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wrote a protest note to Kerensky complaining that Russia was slacken
ing her war effort.

Kerensky replied that the Provisional Government

was doing the best it could, and that his regime was quite grateful
that Francis had shown confidence in it. 41
Francis commented in his memoirs that Kerensky had found himself
in the predicament where he had made
his final and fatal blunder of distributing arms and ammunition to the
workingmen of Petrograd, in order that they might help to defend his
tottering regime against Korniloff and his advanci�g army •••• After
things had been brought to this pass the position of the Kerensky
Government was hopeless. Its overthrow was ohly a matter of time.
Had Lvoff been a wise and strong IllBll instead of the meddlesome rattle
brain that he was, and had Kerensky been big enough to place his
country• s welfare above his own pride and seek some middle grotmd upon
which he and Korniloff might have worked against the Bolsheviks--their
common enemies-they might bet\Jeen them have rescued Russia and the
World from the curse of Bolshevism: and have given the Constitudent
Assembly, the time for convening of which had already been fixed, a
chance to establish a government based upon the consent of the
governed. 1142
Even Francis' optimism seems to be growing thin as he begins to
appreciate the growing radicalism.
a friend,

11

On

September aleven-t:.h he wrote to

The greatest menace to the present situation is the strength

of the Bolshevik sentiment ,�hich, intoxicated with its success (attri
butable in no small degree to the failure of the Kornilov movement),
may attempt to overthrow the present Provisional Government and admin
ister affairs through its own representatives.

If such a condition

should ev0nuate, failure will undoubtedly ensue in a short time, but
meanwhile there may be bloodshed. 11 43 Francis shows his chief concern
4'.Lrompkins, p. 49.

42rrancis, Russia from the American Embassy, pp. 156-57.

43Robert V. Daniels, Red October (New York:
p. 52.

Scribner's, 1967),
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in a letter to American Consul Mosher at Harbin, China.

11

Russia is

certainly going through a severe ordeal, and if she should go out of
the war the whole burden of the contest will fall upon the United
States and would cost untold millions of treasure and probably
millions of American lives. 11 /44
Francis was not totally disheartened by the growing rumors of
impending Bolshevik uprisings against the Provisional government. He
expressed disappointment that the reported Bolshevik uprising didn't
materialize near the end of October, for he felt the movement could
have been crushed by the Kerensky government at that time.

From the

earliest Bolshevik demonstrations in the spring o� 1917, Francis had
recognized Lenin as the brains of the whole movement.

In testifying

before the Congressional Committee in 1919, Francis said Lenin 11 has a
great intellect. He is a fanatic and I think has sincere convictions.
I could not say the same about 'l'rotsky.
turer. He has great ability.

I think Trotsky is an adven

He has more executive ability than

Lenine, but when they have differed, Lenine has always been able to
dondnate Trotsky. 1145

Francis realized these men represented a danger but he failed to
realize that even though the German Government had helped them get
into Russia for its own reasons, Lenin and Trotsky were not puppets.
His conservative background and class psychology militated against his
comprehending the social revolution going on around him, and he was
convinced the Russian people would turn against the Bolsheviks.
44Francis, Russia from the American Embassy, p. 157.
45Bolshevik Propaganda, p. 940.
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Ambassador continued to inform Washington of his confidence and
cabled on October fourth, "My sympathy with Russia deep, sincere, and
my conviction strong that this country will survive the ordeal and

be safe for democracy if we and the Allies are patient and belpf'u1. 11 46
Francis had a standing appointment with Tereshchenko, Minister of

Foreign Affairs, at one o'clock each day.

They had become friends,

and Francis had entertained him at the Embassy.

Francis was quite

outspoken and did not hesitate to tell Tereshchenko what he thought he
should do.

At their meeting on November sixth, Tereshchenko confided

to Francis that he feared a Bolshevik outbreak that very night but
believed that his government troops could suppress it.

He

went on,

"I hope it will take place whether we can suppress it or not--I am

tired of this uncertainty and suspense, 1147

4t>ou11ea, p. 111.
47Francis, Russia fi:,Qm the American Embassy, p. 178.

Ambassador Through an Unofficial Representative
The suspense came to an end on the morning of November 7, 1917.
Lenin came out of hiding and led the Bolsheviks in the successful
overthrow of the Provisional Government.
Francis was unaware of any unusual happenings until he received
a message from the Russian Foreign Office stating that Tereshchenko

could not meet him as usual that day.1 Shortly afterwards Secretary

of the Embassy Sheldon v!hitehouse arrived at the Embassy to relate
that Kerensky had connnandeered a Renault touring car with an American
flag on it, belonging to Assistant Military Attach{ Captain E. Francia
Riggs, in order to go to the front.

When Whitehouse had gone to the

Winter Palace to protest Kerensky's taking a personal car when the
head of the Provisional Governmen·� had dozens of cars at his disposal,
Kerensh-y replied that they had been sabotaged during the night.

He

further stated that the troops in Petrograd now were either Bolshevik

or neutral and would not obey his orders, and he was going to Luga to
find loyal troops to quell the rabble threatening the city.

Kerensky

asked Whitehouse to relay to Ambassador Francis the request 11 that he
not recognize the Soviet Goverwnent 11 and "that he expected the uprising
to be liquidated 'Within five days. 11 2 The Secretary had then requested
that the American flag be rerr..oved from the car before Kerensky used
1Francis, Russia .fr.2!G � American Embassy, pp. 179-80.
2Kennan, Russia Leaves the \Jar, p. 72.

it, but the Russian officers refused. Francis approved of the Secre
tary's conduct but gave orders that no one should spread the story
further.
Francis, unbelieving and flabbergasted, sent a dispatch to Lans
ing on November 7, 1917:

11

Bolsheviki appear to have control of every

thing here. Cannot learn whereabouts of any minister. 11 3 However,
Francis was convinced and he held this conviction to the end, that the
Bolsheviks could not long remain in control of the government.

He

wrote Madden Summers, the consul in Moscow, the following day that
Lenin and Trotsky were Premier and Foreign Minister, respectively, of
the new government.

Francis commented,

11

Disgustingl--But I hope such

effort will be made as the more ridiculous the situation, the sooner

the -remedy. 114

This wait and see attitude was also held
the days following the November Revolution:

by

many Russians during

the Russian ambassador in

Washington repudiated the Bolsheviks and Admiral Kolchak predicted the
in:n:rd.nent fall of their Government.5 For the next four months the
events in Russia developed around two main movements: the strength
ening of the Bolshevik Government and the negotiating of peace v1ith
Germany.

Everyone realized that the stand the Allies took toward the

Bolsheviks Yould influence the Bolsheviks' relationship with Germany.
The problem for the Allies ilas how to prevent Russia's collapse into
the hands of the Central Powers and at the same time refuse to recog.3DuJ.1es, p. 112.
4rrancis, Russia .t:!:£m the American Embass;y:, p. 187.
5Dulles, p. 114.
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nize the only government which was functioning in Petrograd. And how
could the Allies recognize that government which had withdrawn from
the war, repudiated the Tsarist government's foreign debts, propagated
doctrines of world-wide revolution, and totally disregarded the tradi
tional amenities of international relations?
Lansing had informed the American diplomatic corps to have no
communication of any kind with the Bolsheviks.

Francis' reports that

Lenin and Trotsky were German agents and were certainly not to be
trusted greatly influenced the State Department.6 But this posed an
additional problem for Francis and the other Allied ambassadors:

how

do you deal with Russia as an ally when you are not officially on
speaking terms? All of the Allied diplomats developed unofficial
channels of communication with the Bolsheviks.
Francis found his contact in the other official American represen
tation in Russia, the American Red Cross. The Red Cross Commission
had, of course, a Samaritan purpose, but Colonel (all of the Red Cross
officials were given military ranks, uniforms and were subject to
military orders) William Boyce Thompson, its first business manager,
also planned to engage in political

and

propaganda activities whose

object was to strengtb._en the Kerensky government am encourage the war
effort.7 Wilson had approved of these vague plans in principle in
the summer of 1917, but Wilson had the ability to create the irripres
sion on an appointee that he was going abroad 11 as a personal represent>roreign Relations, 1918, Russia, I, 289.
7Hermann Hagedorn, The Na.gnate: Willian. Boyce Thompson and His
Time, 1869-12.lQ (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1935), p. 181.
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tative of the President, endowed with the latter's very special confi
dence 11 and 11a goodly share of the President's authority. 11 8 Unfortu
nately Francis was not told of Thompson's other duties, nor were the
lines of authority between them stated to either one. A Major, later
Lieutenant Colonel, Raymond Robins, worked with Thompson and carried
on his worl: in both areas. Hhile Kerensky I s government had been in
power, Robins opposed the Bolsheviks, but af'ter the November Revolu
tion, he called on the Bolsheviks at their headquarters in the Smolny
Institute to'find out their policies and plans.

After much discussion

Robins found that he agreed with their principles even though he
abhored their excesses. 9 He began to visit Smolny every day and main
tained an unofficial relationship with Lenin and Trotsky. Robins men
tioned this to Francis, and Francis encouraged his unofficial daily
visits in order to receive first-hand information about what the
Bolsheviks were doing.
Francis felt his relations with Robins were always pleasant even
though they disagreed about the Bolshevik government. Francis was
adamantly opposed to any recognition of the government and felt it
would be overthrown soon.

Robins was a strong advocate for United

States recognition of the Bolshevik government, and found it "frustra
ting when Ambassador Francis stood like a brick wall, an impassable

barrier to recognition. n lO

8Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 51.
9

Bolshevik Propaganda, p. 956.

lOsister Anne Vincent Meiburger, Efforts of Raymond Robins toward
the Recognition£! Soviet Russia and the Outlawry of War, 1917-1933,
Diss. Catholic Univ. of America 1958 (Washington, D. C,: Catholic
Univ. of America Press, 1958), p. Z?.
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Circumstances in Petrograd did not improve with the Bolsheviks at
the helm of' government.

Phil Jordan wrote .to Hrs. Francis November 18,

1917 describing the gloomy situation in Petrograd.
Streets are full of all the cut throats and robbers that are in Russia.
you can hear the machine guns and cannons roaring all day and all
night•••• in a house not very ITar] fron the embassy they killed a
little girl and 12 rifle baynets �er� fond stuck through her body .
••• we h.ave 8 Soldiers who are on duty day and night. of course
they cant do any thine but keep out the robbers. if the red gard or
the black hundred Should ever attact the embassy a.�d these soldiers
would fire one shot I am sure that they would Kill every American in
Petrograd. think of all this going on and also how we all ought to be
frightened to death but to tell you the honest truth I don't think we
have two people in the embassy that has at any time lost his head or
his nerve•••• at times we only have tallo.i candles for light. the
plants have no coal and Very little wood •••• the food question is
growing worse every day•••• the Ship arrived with the groceries from
America and that is Saving our lives •••• the Ambassador told me two
days ago to be packed with as little as possible because we might have
to leave in a hurry. ll
Evidently things became more settled for on November JO, 1917,
Phil Jordan wrote to Hiss Annie Pulliam, a cousin of Mrs. Francis,
that Francis had held an open house for two hundred fifty Americans
the day before.
the food:

Jordan commented that the guests had crowded around

"we had all kinds of sandwitches assorted cakes one very

large baked ham sliced so that they

could

make their own ham Sand

wi tehes and four bowls full of champaign punch and

pineapple Ice

Tea.11 12 The Ambassador's schedule was strenous, but he probably

continued these social occasions to boost the morale of the American
colony in Petrograd.
Jordan, in the same letter to Miss Pulliam, tells us something of
the demands on Francis during these turbulent days.
�liss, p. 145.

12�., p. 149.
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the Ambassador is in the Very best of health and still working awful
hard trying to pull Russia through. the outlook is Very Very dark
today. it is now 1125. the Ambassador bas Just finished his break
fast. he never goes to bed during these terrible times until 2 & 3 in
the morning. I always leave him Sleep until he is ready to get up.
At 8 am, and 9 am on up to 11 oclock this man and that Secretary will
come to the door wanting to see the Ambassador on business. I will
tell them no I am very sorry but you cannot See the Ambassador right
now because he is sleeping. I know but this is Very important. I can
not help that. please have this chair and as soon as he is awake I
will give him your card. If I did not do that they would have him up
at 8 am. We have 20 or 30 rifle in the embassy all ready to do ,�hat
we can to hold the Bolsheviks off.13
Late in November the Bolshevik eovernment published the Secret
Treaties which Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy had made among
themselves, and Francis wrote the Department of State on December 5,
1917:

11

1 have the honor to enclose herewith along with other docu

ments a translation of the so-called 'Secret Treaties' as they

appeared in the organ of the Soviets. 11 :14 Those treaties defined the
divisions of territories to be made at the expense of the Central
Powers at the end of the war. Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House had
known about these at least since spring when Mr. Balfour had talked
with them about probable peace terms in Washington.

Although these

treaties conflicted with Wilson's ideas concerning war aims and terms

of peace, he seemed singularly disinterested in them.15

On December

18 Francis was able to send Lansing the text of a nsecret convention
between Russia and Japan having in view joint armed action against
America and England in the Far East before 1921'1 and the secret treaty
of July 3, 1916 negotiated by Sazonov and Motono v1hich Francis had been
13Bliss, p. 149.
l¼amuel Flagg Bemis, The American Secretaries of State and Their
Diplomacy (New York: Cooper Square, 1963), p. 106.
15rbid., p. 105.
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trying to get since it was signed. 16
On e of the recommendations of the Roo� Comrnission was to have a
major propaga.ida campaign in R�sia presenting the Allied cause.

The

Counnittee on Public Information, which promot ed voluntary c ensorshlp
and mobilized public opinion in the United St ates, began planning
immediately.

Two weeks before the Bolsheviks seized power in St.

Petersburg, Edgar G. Sisson, a former newspaper and magazine editor,
was appointed to head the work in Russia.17 Sisson, like Thompson of
the Red Cross }fission, received the impression that he was 1?ilson 1 s
special envoy to Russia with unusual perogatives and powers.

A per

sonal note of instructions from the President on October 24 served to
confirm this:
. Mr. Creel informs me that you are leaving for Russia at once. In
oux conversation of yesterda y I tried to make it clear m;y views as to
the nature and extent of fu'1Y manifestation of our interest in the
Russian struggle, and I know that you will be guided by them in ev ery
thing that you say or do.
We want nothin g for ourselves and this very unselfishness carries
with it an obligation of open dealing. Wherever th e fundamental prin
ciples of Russian freedom are a t stake, we stand read y to render such
aid as lies in our power, but I wan-t; this helpfuL'l'less based upon
request and not upon offer. Guard particularly against any effect of
officious intrusion or meddling, and try to express the disinterested
friendship that is our sole impulse.
It is a distinct service that you are privileged to render your
country and the whole democratic movement� and I know that this will
serve at once as r eward and inspiration. li:>
Unfortunately, no on e told Fra.�cis what Sisson 1 s position was or
the importance of his mission.

The State Department t elegram merely

inforoed Francis that the President had ap pointed Sisson to direct the
16Foreign R elations, 12,17, Supp. 2, I, 709-10.
17
Kennan, Russ ia Leaves the Har, p. 50.

18saker, Woodrow Hilson, VII, 323.
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propaganda campaign under the auspices of the Creel Committee of
Public Information, and requested Francis aid Sisson in

any

way he

could.19 It was not at all clear what the relationship between Sisson

and the Embassy was, and Sisson and Francis had different views of it.
Sisson arrived in Petrograd on November 25, 1917 and called on
Francis.

F ollowing their conversation, Sisson met with Robins and

General William V. Judson who was the Military Attach� and Chief of
the .American Military Mission, and he sided with these men and against
Francis in the matter of comnunicating with the Bolsheviks about the
proposed Armistice vii.th Germany.
The day after the coup Trotsky appealed to the Allies to nego
tiate a general peace.

Ambassador Francis telegraphed the resolution

of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets calling for an arr:rl.stice on all
fronts and the opening of peace negotiations to the State Department.
The peace negotiations were to be open to all, and the terr:is were not
to include any annexations, forcible conquests or inde:mnities. 20 The
Allied representatives in Petrograd met on November 22 and unanimously
agreed to ignore the resolution in spite of the overtures of Sisson,

Robins and Judson.21

A week later Trotsky announced that Russia had ceased a ll military
activity and invited the Allies to join her in negotiating peace terms
with Germany on December the second.

Francis dutifully cabled this to

the State Department, and on December the first Lansing instructed
19foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, I, 215.
010 4�
20Ib1·
a ., pp. �v•
__

ZlIbid. , pp. 2i+lr46.

55
Francis to make no rep:cy to any of Trotsky's overtures.22 Having
heard from none of the Allies, on December the sixth Trotsky announced
the peace negotiations had been postponed in order that the Allied

powers might have time to define their attitude.2.3

In spite of all

these instructions, Judson met with Trotsky several times, and they
discussed military matters and the security of the diplomats in
Petrograd.

Francis protested Judson's actions to the State Department.

On December 22, 1917 the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk
began.

While the Soviets wanted a peace based on non-annexations, the

Germans clamored for huge chm1ks of the old Tsarist empire including a
nominally free but actually German dominated Ukrainian state.

Thus

the Russians faced a most difficult negotiating session, and were
searching for alternative courses of action should the taDcs collapse.
The Bolshevlks sent a cable through Colonel Robins asking ,1hat the
Allies, especially Amei·ica, would do toward helping the Bolshevik
government if the All-Russian Congress of Soviets did not sign the
peace agreeraent.

Francis and Lansing wanted the President to make

some statement to the Russian people, but Wilson believed that it was
unwise to niake any policy statement on Russia at this time.

Wilson

was undoubtedly influenced by Charles R. Crane, who was the one man
listened to by Wilson about Russian affairs.

Crane considered the

Bolshevik Revolution a disaster since he reflected the views and the
situation of his Kadet friends ·who saw this as the end of all they bad
22Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, I, 250, 252-54.

2.3�., J)� 258.
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been working for. 24
On January 2, 1918 Francis talked wit� Robins and gave him a
signed statement entitled "Suggested communication to the Commissioner
for Foreign Affairs." While Robins understood the document was only a
guide for himself and was not to be given to Trotsky, the beginning
and ending.do make vecy clear the way Francis felt.

It began:

"At

the hour when the Russian people shall require assistance from the
United States to r epel the agressions of Germany and her allies, you
may be assured that I will recommend to the American Government that
it render tham all aid and assistance within its power." It ended:
"I may add that if the Russian Armies now under the connnand of the
People's Commissaries commence and seriously conduct hostilities
against the forces of Germany and her allies, I will recommend to my
government the formal recognition of the de facto government of the

People's Oommissaries. n 25

Robins, Thompson and Judson all believed the Bolshevik aims were
the same as Wilson's aims for peace and therefore favored United States
recognition of the Bolshevik regime.

Robins acknowledged that Russia

would probably leave the war, but he believed that if the Allies
supported the Bolsheviks, it was possible "that Bolshevik propaganda • •
• • might prove as effective an ally in the war against German mili
tarism as Russian arms. n26 These man urged their views on Francis,
but he maintained his stance not to have contact or comnrunication with
the Bolsheviks, even unofficially. Thompson felt so �trongly about the
241asch, p. 6.
25Hard, pp. 121-22.
26
Lasch, pp. 70-71.
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lllatter that in December 1917 he went to Washington to bring his views
to the attention of the White House and the State Department. Even
though Thompson talked with many State Department officials, he did
not see the President. The State Department considered Thompson to
• have poor judgement because he had advocated enormous sums of money for
a political information campaign to support the Kerensky regime in the
summer. Wilson remembered what he considered Thompson's "flamboyant
and reckless" spending of funds for propaganda, and he refused to see
Thompson.'Zl
�..athilde de Gram's seem.lngly constant presence at the Embassy
became a real issue again during October and November 1917.

"She

heard policy discussed, ••• and at least one letter report was given
to her by Francis for her perusal •••• her influence was greater
than of

any

official member of the Embassy starr. 11 28 The staff inves

tigated and found the lady was on the secret suspect list of the Inter
Allied Passport Bureau and then notified the State Department of
Francis' activities. The Department directed Francis to break off all
associations \.1ith her :i.Jnmediately as she was suspected of espionage.
Francis was furious and continued his relationship. Finally Judson,
the only member of the staff with enough courage, showed Francis the
evidence including the dossier from the Passport Bureau, but even this

did not shake Francis' belief in Y.i.adame de Cram's innocence.28

Finally Judson, Sisson and Robins requested the State Department to
recall the Ambassador, and appoint someone 11Whom the Bolsheviks trusted
27Lasch, p. 73.
2f\villiam Appleman Williarr�, Americe.n-Russian Relations,
� (Uew York: Ilinehart, 1952), pp. 11.3-14.

11?1-
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and who could explain .America to the Russians. n29
Francis, in the meantime, was also complaining about Sisson and
Robins who were establishing the close relations with the Bolshevik
Government that had been forbidden to the Ambassador.

He

protested

the impression that Sisson gave of being the President's personal
representative. 3 0 These complaints and requests from Francis, Judson
and Sisson resulted in a two-day discussion bet�een the State Depart
ment and the President

as

to which one should be removed or all three.

In this situation Francis won a co;:iplete victory.

"Department

approves your present course and relies on your judgment," cabled
Lansing to Francis • .31 Sisson received a cable from Creel stating that
the "President insists that you avoid political enganglements and

· personal matters • 11 .32 Judson was recalled to Washington. However, the
rumors of Francis' dismissal persisted but on February 4, 1918, Assis
tant Secretary of State Polk reassured Francis1 son Perry that there
was nothing to be concerned about.

"Thompson had not seen the Presi

dent" and had no standing in government circles • .33
After Judson's recall, Francis received a wire from Washington
stating that no representative of the government was to have any
communication with the Bolshevik government.
11

Francis wired back,

Does this include Red Cross officers in uniform?" An affirmative

reply caine back.

Although Robins received similar instructions,

29Lasch, p. 73 •
.30icennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 128.
3½-oreig_n Relations, 1918, Russia, I, ,316 •

.32Baker, Woodrow Hilson, VII, /..,20.
331asch, pp. 82-83.
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Francis felt it unwise for Robins to cease his visits to Smoley, and
furthermore, he wanted to be informed of events and policies formu
lated there. The Ambassador encouraged Robins to maintain his con
tacts at Smolny and promised to intercede for Robins at the State
Department if necessary. Francis wired the United States government to
this effect but received no response so Robins continued his dai'.cy
visits in Petrograd and then in Moscow until he was recalled on Ma;y

14, 191a • .34

The value of Robins' connections with Smolny was shown

by

a

letter from Robins on February 7, 1918 to Francis giving him, on Lenin's
order, the unlisted telephone numbers of Lenin, Trotsky, Chicherin,
Dzerzhinski (head of the secret police), and of the Fortress of St.
Peter and St. Paui. 35 Shortly before Robins left Russia in May 1918,
Francis telegraphed hira from Vologda:

11

Do not feel I should be jus·ti

fied in asldng you to remain longer in Moscow to neglect of the pros
cecution of your Red Cross work; but this does not imply any lack of
appreciation of the service you have rendered roe in keeping me advised
concerning matters important for me to know and giving suggestions and
advice � \-/ell

!!§.

being _g channel .Qf unofficial connnunication � the

Soviet Government. « .36
In December of 1917 the Allied governments had given blanket
permission to their diplomatic staffs in Petrograd to leave Russia and
most of them had eagerly availed themselves of the opportunity •
.34Bolshevik Propaganda, p. 956.
35Francis, MSS •
.36iiard, p. 72.
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Francis was one of the few ambassadors who remained, and he tried to
halt the Red tide sweeping the country by appealing ·to the people to
rebel against their leaders and to take up arms again against the
Germans.

In a public statement Francis declared,

There is no power whose authority is recognized throughout Russia;
your industries are neglected and many of your people are crying for
food. This need can be supplied if you will permit the American rail
way commission to continue its helpful work, as there is sufficient
food in Russia to feed all her people if properly distributed ••••
I have not lost faith in the ability of the Russian people to
solve their own problems •••• A powerful enemy is at your gates. A
desperate enemy is sowing the seeds of dissension in your ITQdst. A
hostile, unscrupulous, imperial government is w.aintaining a well
organized espionage throughout your land. Your liberties are threat
ened. Your beloved land is in danger. Your unapproachable resources
may pass into unfriendly hands. Eternal vigilance is required to pre
serve for your descendants the rich heritage you now hold. Neglect of
present opportunity may entail upon your children a commercial slavery
worse than serfdom. I appeal to you to be watchful of your true
interests and I make this appeal on behalf of my government and my
people, with whom you have ever borne friendly relations, and who
cherish a sincere, deep interest in your welfare. 1137
Francis was convinced that the top Bolshevik leadership were Ger
man agents, and this conviction nurtured Francis' primary reason for
remaining in Russia after the November Revolution:
the Bolshevik Government.

the overthrow of

As late as February 1918 Robins showed

Sisson some documents which supposedly proved that Lenin and Trotsky
were German agents.· Robins was convinced they were forgeries and
later events proved him correct, but Sisson had been undu.:cy influenced
by an interview in which Lenin "referred (smiling and throwing up the
palms of his hands to indicate the absurdity of the charge) to the
£act that he had been called a German spy.n38 Robins had accepted the
statement as an obvious denial but Sisson, suspecting Lenin was perhaps
37Francis, Russia from the American Embassy, pp. 175-76.
38Kennan, Russia Leaves the

lifil:,

p.

412.

61
a spy after all, showed the documents to the Ambassador. Francis wel
comed them as they confirrood his own feelings about Lenin and
Trotsey. 39
Naturally enough Francis' family were concerned about his safety
and thooght he would come home. "� plan," wrote Francis to his son
Charles,
is to stay in Russia as long as I can. If a separate peace is con
cluded, as I believe it 'Hill be, there will be no danger of nzy- being
captured by the Germans. Such a separate peace, however, will be a
severe blo,t to the Allies, and if any section of Russia refuses to
recognize the authority of the Bolshevik Government to conclude such a
peace I shall endeavor to locate in that section and encourage the
rebellion. If no section is opposed to same I shall go to Vladivostok
and endeavor from there to prevent supplies from falling into the hands
of the Germans, and if there are any people organizing in Russia for
armed resistance to Germany, I shall encourage them and recommend our
government to assist them� You may not conclude, therefore that I am
coming back to Amorica.n4u
With the departure of the ill and frustrated Sir George Buchanan
for England in January, 1918, Francis, as the ambassador with the long
est service in Russia, became the dean of the remnant of the diplomatic
corps. He had meetings in the American Embassy every day for those few
ambassadors and ministers who were still present. The one occasion
Yhen he did call on the Bolsheviks as doyen of the diplomatic corps
crune that month. The Bolsheviks had imprisoned Count Constantine Dia
mandi, the Rumanian minister, in the Fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul
on January 14 (New Year's Evening, Old Style) because the Rumanian
government had disarmed and expelled Russian troops who were pillaging
the Rumanian countryside as a result of Bolshevik agitation.

Francis

called a meeting of the entire diplomatic corps at the Embassy the
39williams, pp. 1.36-37.
0
' 4 Francis, Russia from the American Embassy, p. 236.
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following morning, and they drew up a note of protest.

Francis tele

phoned Lenin, who spoke English, and made an appointment for four
o'clock that afternoon.

Francis was spokesman for the group and

declared that there would be no disc.ussion of the matter, that they
wanted nothing less than Diamandi's immediate release.

The French

ambassador, Joseph Noulens, however, wanted to talk about the Dia
mandi affair and an hour and a half's wrangling ensued.

Lenin

referred the matter to the Council of the Soviet which finally agreed .
to release the Rumanian Minister the following day. 41 The soviets
also published in Pravda a statement that upon Diamandi's release the
American Ambassador would protest to the Rumanian minister the attack
of the Rumanians on the Russian troops.

Francis denied making such a

promise, but the matter has never been satisfactorily cleared up.
Robins did alot of behind the scenes work at Smolny and conferred with
Francis several times during the hours Diamandi was confined.

The

evidence would indicate that there is a grain of truth in the news
paper account but that it was never intended that it be divulgea.42
On January the eighth Wilson delivered at a joint session of Con
gress his historic Fourteen P�ints Speech outlining a program for
world peace.

In Poin� Six, he referred specifically to Russia:

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settle
ment of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and
freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for
her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent
determination of her ovn1 political development and national policy and
assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under
institutions of her o,m choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance
43.rrancis, Russia from the American Embassz, pp. 216-18.
f+2i<en.�an, Russia Leaves the

llill:,

pp. 339-40.
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also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The
treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come
will be the acid test of their good will, of their conprehension of
her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their
intelligent and unselfish sympathy.43
Wilson telegraphed this address to Francis with instructions to have
"There is," wrote Wilson in the

it delivered unofficially to Trotsky.

note that accompanied the address, "a voice calling for these defini
tions of principle and of purpose which is, it seems to me, more
thrilling and more compelling than any of the many moving voices with
which the troubled air of the world is filled.

It is the voice of the

Russian people. 1144 The address was also sent through the Creel Com
mittee on Public Information and was published in full in the Soviet
and other Russian newspapers.45
Wilson's words brought cheers from the American diplomatic staff
in Petrograd for this was what Francis had been waiting for to con
vince the Russians that the American Yar aims were not imperialistic,
and that they should not sign any separate peace with Germany, but
take up arms and fight the Germans.

Robins and Sissqn were also

excited about Wilson's message and hurriedly carried it to Lenin who

also seemed pleased . However, as Kennan points out, "there is no

evidence tha t he ("i:enii] took it seriously as an expression in good

faith of American policy, or that it changed anything in his view of
the motives of the United States government. 11 46 Wilson understood

43Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., The Public Papers
of Woodrow \-lilson, ·war and Pef'�: Presidential Hessar,es, Addresses,
and Public Pa12ers (1917-1924) (New York: Harper, 1927), III, 159-60.
�oreign Relations, 191�, Russia, I, 426.
45:Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VII, 455.
46Kennan, Russia Leaves the

llfil:,

p. 260.
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that the principle of self-determination of peoples was of prime
importance to Lenin while actually, Lenin held that the interests of
socialism and of the Socialist Republic had superiority over every
thing.· In view of this Lenin realized that the Soviet people would
not stand for a renewal of hostilities; they must have peace at any
cost.
The Fourteen Points Address must have caused the recognition
issue to come to the fore again.

11

This government not disposed as

yet," telegraphed Lansing to the American Ambassador in Russia on
January 15, 1918,

11

to recognize any independent governments until the

will of the Russian people has been more definitly expressed on this
general subject. The public utterances of the President have defined
clearly the sympathy of the United States for democracy and self
government.n47 Hilson was an idealist, and while his ideals as
expressed in Point Six were noble, they were far from realistic.

The

_Russian people were not prepare.d for self-government or self
determination in 1918.48
In January, too, the Constituent Assembly finally met on the
eighteenth.

The Provisional Government had stated, immediately after

its organization in March, 1917 that one of its principles was "to
proceed forthwith to the Preparation and convocation of a Constituent
Assembly based on universal suffrage which will establish a stable
governmental regime. 11 49 The Petrograd Soviet had endorsed the Consti47Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 743.

48Arthur s. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1957), p. 117.
49Francis, Russia from� American EmbassY. p. 196.
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tuent Assembly, and even the Imperialistic element supported it, as
evidenced by the Grand Duke Michael's abdication statement which asked
the citizenry to support the Prov-lsional Government until the Consti
tuent .Assembly decided upon the new form of government.
In spite of such diverse support, the September elections for
delegates to the Assembly were repeatedly postponed because of the
difficulties in framing a suitable election procedure.

It fell to the

new Bolshevik regime in late November to hold the long-awaited vote,
but the Bolsheviks were disappointed when only a small minority of the
seats were captured by their party.

They postponed the December meet

ing of the Assembly to January and meanwhile arrested the deputies of
the Constitutional Democratic Party. Francis held a meeting of the
entire Diplomatic Corps the day before the Assembly was to convene.
He wanted them to attend as a group for he felt their presence might
have a "pacifying effect," but the majority disagreed on the grounds
they had not been invited. Francis insisted the Corps should be
represented, but he could get no one to join him in attending so he
did not go either. 5 0
By four o'clock on the afternoon of the eighteenth, over four
hundred deputies, scarcely one-third of them Bolsheviks had assembled
in the Tauride Palace. The president of the Petrograd Soviet issued
an ultimatum to the Assembly declaring that all power now rested with
the Council of Peoples' Commissaries.

The Assembly refused to

acknowledge this, and the Bolsheviks withdrew.

After a night of

street fighting between the Red Guard and the non-Bolshev:i.k delegates,
5°Francis, Russia�

lli
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Lenin disbanded the Assembly

by

force. 51

Francis kept the State Department informed as best he could of
the Assembly's progress.

"Department appreciates gravity of the

political situation and the possible danger of a crisis," Secretary
Lansing telegraphed to Francis on February first.

Do you recommend

11

any moderation of Department's attitude towards the Bolshevik authori
ties? If so, explicitly state your vie�s.

Department is not disposed

to put you and the members of the Embassy staff in personal danger if
it can be avoided without comprortlsing the position of the govern

ment. u 52

The safety of the Embassy staff was certainly the prime consid
eration, but there is evidence from both Francis' and Washington's
wires that some sort of accomodation between the two governments was
being considered at this time. This possibility of partial recogni
tion of the Bolshevik government was strengthened
Lansing to Francis on February fourteenth:

by

a telegram from

"Department ••• desires

you gradually to keep in somewhat closer and informal touch with
Bolshevik authorities using such channels as will avoid any official
recognition. 11 53
On February 10, 1918 at Brest-Litovsk, Trotsky refused to sign an
annexationist treaty but made his dramatic unorthodox statement:
decline to sign those severe peace terms, but Russia will fight no
more. n 54
51Francis, Russia� the American Embassy, pp. 203-06.

52Foreigp Relations, 1918, Russia, I, 364.
53
. Ibid., p. 381.
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The Germans were stunned at first, but in less than a week were marching on Petrograd

and

Moscow.

"Soviet government demoralized .

. ."

telegraphed Ambassador Francis on February twentieth, "Germans could
control city within forty-eight hours.n55 Two days later Francis
reported that the Bolsheviks were resisting the Germans in spite of
the disintegration of the A:rmy.
with soldiers returning home.

The stations and trains were jammed
The "Five Allied Ambassadors agreed to

support resistance if offered. 11 5 6
By

February twenty-sixth, the Germans had advanced to within six

to eight hours of Petrograd and Francis felt certain the Germans would
capture Petrograd and hold the diplomatic corps as hostages. He
reluctantly decided to evacuate the Embassy and chose the little
provincial town of Vologda as his destination because it was 350 miles
east of the German position and thus for the moment secure. Vologda

was also at the junction of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Moscow
.Archangel Railway which could enable his staff to take refuge ulti
lllately in Archangel if that should be necessary. 57 Then, too, Francis
did not want to give the Germans the impression that the Allied powers
had abandoned the idea of Russian participation in the war.

Certainly

the presence of the envoys on Russian territory would influence their
judgment of how many soldiers they could afford to transfer from the
eastern front. 58
55Forei@ Relations, 1918, Russia, I, 381.
56
l..1&9,., p. 386.-

57Francis, Russia from the American Embassy, p . 234.

58George F. Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1961), pp. 80-81.
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Francis, the few members of his staff he had not sent home,
Colonel Robins, and the Chinese Legation and Japanese, who would be
en route to the Pacific, began the uncertain train trip to Vologda
late on February the twenty-sixth. 59

59Francis, Russia� the American Embassy, p. 23 5 .

Ambassador to the People of Russia
Francis left Petrograd just in the nick of time for German air
planes bombarded the city the day after he departed.

In a letter to

Mrs. Francis on March 9, 1918, Phil Jordan relates their living on the
train for several days before being welcomed by the Mayor of Vologda.
The mayor, who was not a Bolshevik, found an unoccupied commercial
club house for them to live in, and also found them a cook, a chamber
maid and a roonth 1 s supplies.l This house became known as the American
Embassy, and the people of Vologda were quite proud and pleased to-be
the diplomatic center of Russia for a few months.

Francis held daily

meetings of the diplomatic corps there and entertained the local
officials at receptions. ·while Francis was in Vologda, the Bolshevik
government arranged for he and Robins to have a telegraph wire between
Moscow and Vologda open for their use every day at a certain hour.2
Phil Jordan usually accompanied Francis on his daily walk to the
telegraph office for his confidential 11 unofficial 11 communications with
Robins.
Meanwhile the Brest-Litovsk negotiati ons continued, but due to a
mix-up in telegrams Lenin and Trotsky thought the Germans had broken
off the talks and were preparing a military advance on Petrograd and
Moscow.

In light of these developments on March fifth in Petrograd

1Bliss, pp. 155-57.

2Hard, p. 76.
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Trotsky again approached Raymond Robins to find out what aid the
Soviets could expect from America if the Soviets rejected the Brest
Litovsk Treaty.

Robins prevailed on Trotsky and Lenin to write out

their proposals and their questions for the All ies.

The message was

coded into the Military Code of the United States War Department by
two .American officers who had been left :in Petrograd when the V.d.litary
Mission went to Vologda with the Embassy.

Robins wired it to Vologda

for transmission to the United States. However, the only man at
Vologda who knew that code was not there so the message was not sent.
Robins found this out the following day and had the message sent to
the War Department directly from Petrograd. 3 Rob:ins also took Trotsky's
message to Francis at Vologda, and on the ninth the Ambassador sent it
to Washington in the State Department code.
Raymond Robins was opposed to the Japanese intervention in
Siberia, which was rumored to be imminent, because the Soviet leaders
had hinted that if the Allies prevented intervention in the Far East,
they might resist Germany's aggression whether or not a treaty was
signed. However, if Japan did land troops in Siberia, they would be
forced to capitulate to Germany.4 Robins convinced Francis of the
wisdom of his position and Francis sent the following cable on the
ninth:

11

I cannot too strongly urge tha folly of intervention by the

Japanese just now.

It is possible that the Congress of Soviets may

ratify the peace, but if I receive assurance from you that the Japa
nese peril is baseless, I am of the opinion that the Congress will
.'.3iiard� pp. 134-44.
4Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, pp. 492-93.

72
reject this humiliating peace. 115 Japan continued to push for her own
intervention at Vladivostok but her obvious imperialistic aims were
such that Wilson was adamant in his opposition.

Lenin gave Robins

the credit for Wilson's position because the Red Cross representative
had persuaded Francis to urge American opposition to a Japanese land
ing in Siberia.6

Francis sent Robins to Moscow to keep him posted on events there.
Because of the unforeseen delay in sending the message, Robins
requested Lenin to delay the opening of the Fourth Special All
Russian Congress of Soviets wh ich was to consider the ratification of
the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. It was delayed until March fourteenth and
still no word from Washington or from London where Bruce Lockhart had
also sent the memorandum. The Congress of representatives of Russia's
workers and peasants debated for two days, and still Robins had to
tell Lenin he had heard nothing.

London did not respond either and

the treaty was ratified on March 15, 1918.7
Wilson did send a message to the people of Russia through the
Fourth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, on March eleventh, before
receiving Robins' cable. His cable read in part,
Although the Government of the United States is unhappily not now in a
position to render the direct and effective aid it would wish to ren
der, I beg to assure the people of Russia through the Congress that it
will avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more
complete sovereignty and independence in her own affairs and full
restoration to her great role in the life of Europe and the modern
world.
"1Iard, pp. 144-45.
6i4eiburger, p. 186.

7Hard, pp. 148-53.
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The whole heart of the people of the United States is with the
prople of Russia in the attempt to free themselves forever from auto
cratic governme nt and become masters of their own life,8
The is not what Lenin and Trotsky nor Robins, for that matter,
were looking for in the way of support from the United States,

The

Congress of Soviets were less t han enthusiasti c over the message and
sent back a reply that was nothing short of insulting.

It expressed

appreciation to the Ameri can people but also expressed "confidence
that th e happy time is not far distant when the toiling masses of
all bourgeois countries will throw off the yoke of capitalism and will
establish a socialist order of society, which alone is capable of

assuring a firm and just peace as well as the cultural and material
'14ell being of all the toilers. 11 9
While in Vologda, on March seventeenth, Francis issued an address
to the Russian people urging them to repel the German invasion. He
assured them that the American people still considered them to be
their allies and did not recognize the peace treaty.

Francis heard no

official repercussions from the Soviet Government to this address, but
Kuehlmann, German Min ister of Foreign Affairs, demanded Francis be
expelled from Russia for violating the la�s of neutrality and essenti
ally calling the Russian people to arms.
Francis continued to hope for the fall of the Bolsheviks and to
be alert to any sign of resistance to them. He hopefully cabled Ray
mond Robins late in March, "Do you hear of any organized opposition to
Soviet government in Russia?

I have not.

Hhere are Milyukoff',

8Eak.er, The Public Paners .2f Woodrow Wilson, III, 191.

9Foreign Relations, 191S, Russia, I, 399.
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Kerensky, Rodzianko, Prokopovitch, Goutchk.off, and other leaders?ttlO
The following day, Robins wired back,

11

Know of no organized opposition

to Soviet government internally. Whereabouts of persons named matter
of mere rumor. n il

Indeed, the question of whether or not to intervene in Russia
after the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was signed was a burning issue for the
Allies.

France and Britain favored intervention and strongly urged

their position on President Wilson. Wilson, on the other hand,
believed the second Russian Revolution was the realization of the
hopes and dreams of the people; and therefore, intervention against
the Bolsheviks would be identical to intervention against the people.
The best course of action to eliminate Bolshevism according to Wilson
would be to send food, technicians and doctors to the Russian people. 12
Francis' position on intervention had changed somewhat

by

the

early spring of 1918. He had begun to have second thoughts on non
interference, but he hoped the Bolsheviks would ask the Allies to
intervene and he did feel the Allies should wait to be asked.

On the

other hand if conclusive evidence was discovered that Germany con
trolled the Bolshevilcs, he felt the Allies should intervene at the
first opportunity.13
10
c. K. Cumming and Walter W. Pettit, eds., Russian-American
Relations, March, l2J1-�, 1920 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
Howe, 1920), p. 117.
llibid., p. 118.

12Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Fro1n Wilson to Roosevelt (Cambridge:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1963), p. 81.
13Betty 111.ller Unterberger, America'� Siberian Expedition 1918,!9.20 (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1956), pp. 47-1;3.
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The arrival of Count Wilhelm von ltirbach as German ambassador to
the Soviet government on April twenty-sixth Yas evidence enough for
Francis that Germany had too much influence over the Russian Govern
ment. He felt Germany should not have the opportunity to extend or
consolidate her influence in Russia, and he urged the State Department
to intervene as an anti-Bolshevik measure.14
Even before the Brest-Litovsk treaty was signed, the Allied
military supplies at Hurmansk and Archangel were in danger of falling
into the hands of the Germans. The British and French had troops at
Murmansk and Francis sent a report on conditions there based on a wire
f�omLieutenant Hugh S. Martin, assistant military attache, who had
met with Russian, British, and French officers at Murmansk.

"Several

hundred marines landed ••• , more troops expected ••• organizing to
defend Murman Railway from threatened or probable attack by Germans.
He says that he saw a telegram from Trotsky approving of concerted
action, and all regretted that ·no American officers on the ground to

participate. 1115

A�er the peace was signed, the British felt the Germans would
demand the evacuation of Murmansk by the Allies.

Therefore they urged

a strong representative Allied show of force there.

On March twenty

eighth Francis wired the Secretary of State, "that presence of American
war vessel �t Murma.nsil would have good effect. Military attach� and
I so recommend.

Can you send one? French, Italian Em,bassy, Serbian

Legation arriving Vologda tomorrow numbering seventy.
14unterberger, pp. 47-48.
15Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 470.
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gratifying but regrettable from food standpoint. 11 16
These diplomats along with t�e British bad left Petrograd the
same day Francis had, but they ha d attempted to return home.

They had

been caught on the Red Guard side of Finland, and only the British had
gotten through.

Now those remaining were rejoining Francis in

Vologda.
The strain of the unfamiliar and uncertain political situations
and the long Russian winter were taking their toll on Francis.

Sisson

ha4 mentioned Francis' being ill in December, but he became seriously
ill in late April, and Phil Jordan wrote Mrs. Francis on the twenty
eighth that he had been in bed a week. Jordan assured her the best
doctor (a Russian) in Vologda was treating her husband and that he,
Jordan, was nursing him day and uight.

Jordan passed on his descriP

tion of Francis' ailment as 11 caused from Something bursting on the
inside and it has now Started to heal and least thing rough like meat
or bread will start it bleeding again. 11 17 Phil Jordan was quite opti
mistic Francis would recover completely after a strict regimen of bed
rest and a soft diet.
On

May fifth Francis was shocked to learn that Madden Summers, the

American Consul-General in Moscow, had died there after a twenty-four
hour illness.

Even though he was still weak from his own sickness,

Francis took the next train to Moscow and delivered an oration at
Summers' funerai.18 The Soviet Government attenpted
to
communicate
.
.
1�oreign Relations, 1913, Russia, II, 471.

17Bliss, pp. 158-60.

18Francis, Russia� the American Embassy, p. 2.38.
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with Francis at that time and he did receive a deputy minister but he

had no official relations with the Bolsheviks.19

Francis stayed on in Moscow for two extra days to study the situ
ation, especially a rumored German ultimatU1u that included the condi
tion that British and French troops leave the Murmansk Peninsula.
Francis wired his views to the Secretary of State on May eighth.

11

If

a demand for evacuation Murraan is denied, Soviet government will
require and probably request Allied assistance.

If Soviet government

accedes to German demand, of course 1.furman will not be evacuated and
in such event Allied intervention should be announced regardless of
Soviet ·wishes •••• No known organized opposition to Soviet govern
ment with force at its command but dissatisfaction herewith evidently
�ndicate�, and maintain

nw

opinion majority of Russian people would

welcome Allied intervention. 11 20
By the first of May Francis had made up his mind that the Allies
should intervene at Archangel and should do so with large military
forces.

He believed that the intervention should involve invasion

into Russian territory, cooperation with the Czechoslavakian forces
against the Red Guards along the Trans-Siberian Railway, arid,

11

a

hastening of burial ceremonies for the Soviet regime itselr.1121 This
last was most important to Francis.

The Ambassa.dor, in a letter to

vice-consul Felix Cole at Archangel six weeks later on June thirteenth,
19i3olshevik Propaganda, p. 954.
2�oreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 473.

2¾:rnest Milton Halliday, The Ignorant Armies (Ne.t York: Harper,
1958), p. 20.
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explained that the deciding factor in his recommending the United
States intervene at this time was "that I �eard the Soviet Government
would demand the evacuation of Murmansk

by

the Allies. 11 22

Another

factor must have been Robins, who had worked hard to persuade Francis
to recoIDL1end United States 1 recognition of the Soviet regime.

The

relationship between the t,w men had become strained as Robins
realized his ambitions were not to be realized as Francis' voice was
heard in Washington, and as Francis realized how far reaching Robins'
ambitions went.
11

In my judgment, 11 Francis telegraphed the State Department on

Hay second,

11

time for Allied intervention has arrived. Have been

hoping for request therefor
to that end.

...

1123

by

Soviet and have been discreetly working

Francis proceeded to list the things he had

done to force the Soviet governnent to request intervention.

"He had

remained in Russia••• • He had encouraged Robins ••• to cultivate
close unofficial relations with the Bolsheviki •••• He had opposed
unilateral Japanese intervention.

He had encouraged

the prof-

fering of Allied military advice in the formation of a new arcy. He
had tried to have Anierican railroad men sent from the Far East to help
the Soviet Government. He had favored the revival of commercial
exchanges.
tiona •••

.

.

. . He had turned the other cheek to many Soviet restric-

1124

22Franci s, HSS •

23Fra�cis, Russia from the Americnn Embassy, p. 298.

Z¼eorge F. Kennan, Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920: �
Decision to Intervene (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1958),
pp. 213-14.
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Francis had encouraged the Russian people to demand Allied inter
vention, but he had given up hope that such, sentiment would be verba
lized as the Soviet government savagely repressed any opposition,
calling it counter-revolutionary.25
On May twenty-ninth Francis telegraphed the Secretary of State
that he and the British, .French, and Italian representatives were all
sendin@ cables urging irrn;1ediate Allied intervention of Murmansk and
Archangel.
I have not changed from rrry expressions except to grow. in the
conviction that Allied intervention advisable from every viewpoint.
Red Army organization is a failure and Trotsky influence rapidly wa.--i
ing. Chicherin absolutely controlled by Lenin who champions peace at
any price and social revolution. German Ambassador endeavoring in
every way to establish closer relations with Soviet govern..�ent and
effectually succeeding. A:m. convinced if we wait for Bolsheviks 1 invi
tation Allies will never intervene••••
Soviet government asserts Allied intervention spells German cap
ture of Moscow and Petrograd and possible true but Soviet government
daily grows weaker and I much doubt whether ·would op pose Allied inter
v-ention. Opponents of Bolsheviks a.'1d of Germany and friends of Allies
expect at any moment Allied intervention and would be greatly disap
pointed if it did not occur. Hy judgment is that iinl:iediate interven
tion is opportune and further delay dangerous. }zy- colleagues affirm
that Japan likely to intervene even vrithout Allied consent but I doubt
that •••• Think advisable that ••• every precaution taken that
Allied press not revear.26
Wilson, finally, ver'J reluctantly, yielded to Allied pressure to
divert Unit ed States troops from France to Murni.ansk, but onl y if Gen
e ral Foch were amenable.
specific purpose:

However, he sent American troops for a very

to guard militar y stores, and not for participatio n

in the Russian Civil War; and he sent only a small force for a brief
time. 27 Francis' advice must have had some influence on Wilson 1 s
25Kennan, The Decision to Intervene, p. 215.

2�reign Relations, 1918, II, 179-80.
27Link, Wilson the Diplomatist, p. 118.
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decision to intervene at this time, but Wilson did not agree with
Francis about the form the intervention should take.
The Central Soviet government had tolerated the British and
French forces at HurIP.ansk and Archangel since early :March.

On June

seventh, however, they hardened their position and Trotsky sent a note
to the Regional Soviet warning them not to fraternize with the
foreigners.

A few days later the Allied representatives in Moscow

received notes protesting the presence of the warships in Russian
ports. The rift between the Murmansk Soviet and Moscow widened as
HoscoH insisted they break off relations with the British.

On July

sixth an agreement was reached between the Murmansk Soviet and the
representatives of the allied powers which recognized the Muxmansk
government and provided for the common defense of the area.

This

caused the final break between the Hurmansk Soviet and Moscow, and
the United States became a party to this agreement in October. 28
On July

4, 1918 Francis gave a reception for the diplomatic

representatives as well as many Russian friends in the town of Vologda.
Francis, of course, made a speech about our Independence from England
and of encouragement to the Russian people.
My country and all of the Allies consider the Russian people
still in the struggle. We do not observe the Brest-Litovsk peace.
Surely no Russian who loves his country and looks with pride on her
greatness is going to submit tamely to her dismemberment and humilia
tion.
We will never stand idly by and see the Germans exploit the
Russian people and appropriate to Germany's selfish ends the imi::1.ense
resources of Russia. I appeal to the Russian people to take courage,
to organize to resist the encroachments of Germ.any. The Allies are
your friends and are willing and able to assist you •••• 11 29
28Kem1an, Th� Decision to Intervene, pp. 371-76.

29Francis, Russia from the American Embassy, pp. 239-42.
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Francis' speech was printed in the local paper, and he had copies
made for general distribution.

Once again Francis had appealed to

the people, in effect, over the heads of the Russian Government which
served to antagonize the Bolsheviks further.
By summer life in Vologda had settled into a tranquil routine
for the diplomats.

They were all settled in comfortable but not

luxurious or spacious quarters.

Food was available, and Phil Jordan

could ,vork miracles with what he procured from the surrounding country
side.

A general mess was operated from the Club House which was k.n01-m

as the American Embassy.

Jordan also found a grassy field near the

edge of town which he converted into a makeshift golf links for
Francis.

In the evenings there was bridge or poker at the Embassy

with Francis teaching the others many card games.

'W'nen interest

lagged here, there was conversation but it tended to be reminiscences
of the men and their homelands, of interest only to the speakers.JO
Thus the events of July were a rude awakening to the diplomatic
colony in Vologda.

First came the news that the German An�bassad or to

Russia, Count Mirbach, had been assassinated July sixth in Moscow.
Then the news of uprisings in Moscow and Yaroslavl which was halfway
between Moscow and Vologda arrived.

All telegraphic communication to

Moscow was ten!poraril.y disrupted because of the Yaroslavl disorders,

and the Allied representatives became anxious for their own safety • .31

Telegraphic connection between Francis and the State Department had
also been severed because of the troubles at Murmansk, but Francis
3�ennan, The Decision to Intervene, pp. 438-39.
31 lli.g._, pp. /442-43.
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was unaware his cables had not been going through.
Around the tenth of July Francis receiyed a message from Chi
cherin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Government in Mos
cow.

The telegram which addressed Francis as the Dean of the Diplo

matic Corps, read,
Taking into consideration the present situation and possibility of
danger for representatives of Entente powers Soviet GoYernment looks
upon Moscow as town where security of named representatives can be
assured. Considering as its duty safeguarding ambassadors' security
Government sees in their coming to Moscow a necessity. We hope that
highly esteemed American Ambassador will appreciate this step in
friendly spirit in which it is undertaken. In order to execute this
measure and to remove any difficulties Peoples' Comr...issariat for
Forei@ Affairs delegates to Vologda as its representative, Citizen
Radek. 32
Francis considered the wire an invitation and telegraphed a refusal,
hoping to avoid a visit by Radek.

11

1 am requested by them �hiefs of

Allied Mission� to ask you, 11 wired Francis,
why you think our remaining in Vologda unsafe or inadvisable. We have
no fear of the Russian people, whom we have always befriended and whom
we consider our Allies, and we have fuJJ. confidence in the population
of Vologda. Our only anxiety is concerning the forces of the Central
Empires with whom we are at war and, in our judgement they are much
more likely to capture Moscow than Vologda. We realize that in a
country suffering as Russia is at present there are unreasonable and
desperate men, but we are confident that they are not more dangerous
at Vologda. than elsewhere. At Moscow, on the other hand, we hear that
the Germans have already received permission to introduce their troops
to safeguard their representatives, and in any case the town is direct
ly threatened by the Germans. If you mean by your message that the
government of Soviets has taken without consulting the Allied Missions
the decision that the latter should come to Hoscm� and that you are
sending }Ir. Radek to carry such a decision into execution, we desire to
inform you that we consider that would be offensive to us and we would
not comply herewith. 33
However, Citizen Radek, in uniform with a large cartridge belt,
32Francis, Russia from the American Embassi, pp. 245-1..h.
3Jrbid., P� 246.
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appeared the following day to pressure the Corps to go to Moscow.
Radek was a short man, 11Yith wide protruding ears, a face framed with
a monkey-like frings of beard ••• and large yellow teeth from which
there incessantly hung an incongruous Dutch pipe.n34 His startling
appearnace lent emphasis to his brilliant wit and his devastating
insolence.
After checking in with the local soviet and imposing strict
censorship, Radek called Francis and made an appointment. He arrived
one hour late while the Allied Chiefs were in session at the Embassy.
Bruce Lockhart, the British agent in Russia, was in Vologda at this
time and described the visit in his diary.

Radek "appeared before the

Ambassadors with his revolver. He argued, cajoled, and even threat
ened. He interviewed them jointly and singly, but the Ambassadors
stood fi:rm. 11 .35 Upon hearing Francis' refusal to go to Moscow, Radek
had guards posted around all of the embassies. Francis protested this
move which made them all prisoners. Radek replied, "you are not
virtually prisoners, you can go in and out and the chiefs can go in
and out, but when you desire anybody to come in here, you will have to
tell the local Soviet his name and they will give him a pass to enter
through the guards. 11 36 When Francis realized the guards were hungry,
he fed them, and they were quite accomodating to the Allied Missions. 37
Radek wired Moscow of the events at Vologda, and the wire fell into
3 'icennan, � Decision to Intervene, p. 445.

35Lockhart, p. 302.
36Francis, Russia from the American Embassy, p. 248.
37Bolshevik Propaganda, p. 948.
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Allied hands.

Lockhart noted in his diary the wire had stated in

part, "Ambassador Francis is a stuffed shirt-front. 11 Lockhart
added that he.agreed.38
Several days later, on the seventeenth, a British officer,
Captain McGrath, came down from .Archangel with a message from General
F.

c.

Poole, who was the British commanding officer at .Archangel, for

the diplomats.

Poole wanted the Diplomatic Corps to come to .Archangel

so as not to ham.per any of their military plans, and he also feared
the Soviet Government might capture the diplomats, hold them as hos
tages or harm them.

By this time Francis was well aware of these

possibilities, and he quickly agreed for the Diplomatic Corps to be
ready to leave at a moment's notica. 39
On July twenty-second Chicherin sent another telegram. marked
11

Urgent 11 which sh0v1ed the Soviets had heard rumors of the planned

landing.
minister.

"I entreat you earnestly to leave Vologda, 11 wrote that
"Come here.

Danger _a:p1-iroaching. To-morrow may be too

late. When battle rages, distinction of houses cannot be made. If
all smashed in your domiciles during struggle of contending forces
responsibility will fall upon your mating deaf ear to all entreaties.
Why bring about catastrophe which you can avert? tt 40
Francis and the other diplomats were not impressed with the
advantages of Moscow in terms of their own personal safety, and they
correctly suspected they would be held as hostages in Moscow against
38Lockhart, p. 302.

39Francis, Russia from the American Embassy. pp. 251-52.
40Ibid., p. 253.
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any eventualities.

They decided to leave for Archangel as soon as

possible, but not to tell Chicherin their destination.
for your telegram, 11 wired Francis to Chicherin.

11

"Thank you

We fully appreciate

the uninterrupted interest you have taken in our personal safety and
have decided to follow your advice and are leaving Vologda. n41
Francis had had a special train on the tracks at Vologda for five
months. He and the station master were friends, and the station mas
ter had promised him a locomotive at an hour's notice to take him any
where tracks from Vologda led.

Francis notified him of his decision

to leave at eight on the evening of July twenty-third.42 As fate
would have it, the friendly station master was on vacation.

His

replacement said he could not furnish a locomotive without submitting
the request to Moscow, and Chicherin had given orders to the Director
of Locomotive Power not to put a locomotive on that train.

Francis

told him t� send the request anyway; and Chicber in, of course, discov
ered their plans.

By this time the Soviet was well aware that there

was imminent Allied action to take place at Archangel. 43 ' 11 If your
intention," wired Chicherin,
is to leave Russia, we a
· re powerless to hinder you in doing so, but we
express our sincerest regrets at your departure from our soil together
with our hope to see you soon in our midst here in the hearts of
Soviets of Russia •••• If however, the idea of exchanging Vologda
for Archangel was not altogether removed from your mind it is unfortu
nately necessary to draw your attention to the fact that in the expec
tation of a seige Archangel cannot be a residence fit for Ambassadors •
• • • -we can, with complete earnestness, point to Moscow, where as
experience shows our forces are and cannot but remain fn undisturbed
41:Francis, Russia�� American Embassy. p. 253.
42Ibid.
4.3J:bid., pp. 254-60.
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control of the city and to its peaceful gay suburbs with their splen
did villas as to an appropriate abode which government proposes to the
Ambassador of friendly America••••11 44

..

Francis replied that his leaving Russia would only �ome by force,
and vould be temporary at that.

He ended the telegram:

"Again we

request the locomotive." All the diplomatic corps had boarded the
train on July twenty-third and had slept there that evening.

Chicherin

finally released the locomotive and the train left at one in the morn
ing of the twenty-fifth.45 On arriving at Archangel, they found the
railroad tracks did not go into the city proper, but stopped south of
the Dvina River.

They were met by a delegation from the local soviet

and a representative from the Moscow Soviet who showed them a boat on
the river. 46 The delegation told them the boat was theirs, and would
take them wherever they chose to go.

Francis refused to get on the

boat stating that not only did he want to communicate with his own
government which he had not been able to do for three weeks, but also,
the designated boat was too sr.iall for his psrty of one himdred farty
persons.

It was July tuenty-sixth.

The Soviet furni shed' them with

another boat and put a guard around the train before crossing the
Dvina River to go into :Archangel to telegraph the proceedings to Mos
cow. The problem was that the Mosc01.f Soviet said publickly they
wanted the diplomats to leave Russia, but privately, they commanded the
local soviet to hold them as hostages.
While the Bolsheviks were gone, the Diplomats lea�ned of plans for
MFrancis, Russia� the American Embassy, p. 255.

45Bolshevik Propar,anda, p. 949.

46.Francis, Russia from the American Embas�, pp. 261-64.
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an anti-Bolshevik revolution in Archangel.

They did not want to be

there when it occurred and decided to go to Kandalaksha, which was
under Allied control, immediately.

The Soviets also knew of the

impending revolt and had been killing and deporting anti-Bolsheviks.
The Bolshevik delegation returned early in the afternoon of July
twenty-seventh and delayed them further to gain time. First, they
insisted the diplomats 1 baggage be identified as none had seals.
Francis had this done and all the baggage was back on their boats by
evening. Next, the Bolsheviks insisted they come off the boats and
show their passports before reimbarking. This the diplomats did, and
by midnight, all was in order.

Then the Bolsheviks said the passports

would have to be vised in Archangel, so off they went again. While
the Bolshevlks were tending to this, the diplomats decided to leave at
seven in the morning whether or not they had been cleared.

They

planned to go to Kandalaksha on a British merchantman which was in the
harbor.

Hm,ever the Soviets came back at four in the morning, cleared

them, and they left on the tiny steamers providea. 47
When they arrived at Kandalaksha Francis learned that the British
Commander, General Poole, was at Murmansk, one hundred fifty miles to
the north.

The Ambassador immediately telephoned him telling him of

the anti-Bolshevik coup d 1 etat that was planned to occur simultaneously
with the expected Allied landings.

Further, the anti-Bolsheviks could

wait no longer to act and requested immediate Allied a,ction.

Francis

urged that Poole brL.�g forces to occupy Archangel immediately.48
47Bolshevik Propaganda, pp. 949-50.
/4.8Richard H. Ullman, Intervention .fil19. the
ton Univ. Press, 1961), p. 235.
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Francis decided to go to Murmansk to talk with Poole and also to
communicate with Washington which he had been unable to do far weeks.
11

The Ambassador and 150 others all piled into box cars," wrote Phil

Jordan to Mrs. Francis, "and .rent to Momansk

by

rial over the roughest

R. R. I ever was on except the missouri and north arkansas. 11 49 Jordan
did the cooking for them with only a small spirit lamp, and he could
only serve, when the train stopped,

by

going from boxcar to boxcar.

FinaD_y they arrived at Murmansk Harbor and found it full of
English and French warships and minesweepers.
1o1rote Jordan,

11

"All looked good, 11

but the Grandest Sight of them all was the U. S. battle

Ship Olympia with the Stars and Stripes flying in the breeze • • • • n50
Francis and Jordan remained aboard the Olympia for three days, enjoying
the feeling of security and the good meals.

When the Ambassador

11

wanted to go ashore I would tell the man on watch, 11 wrote Jordan to
Mrs. Fra.11cis.

He would call all officers and Sailors on attention

11

and Salute as he passed.

then.they would Sond taps as we go doun the

ladder to inter the launch.

the band will play my country tis of the

which is all Very touching to me • • • 1151
They soon learned that General Poole had left Murmansk for
Archangel with about two thousand men.

However, Francis, the British

commissioner, Italian Ambassador and the French minister were all able
to communicate with their governments.
49Bliss, p. 161.
50Ibid

--·

51 Ibid

.,

p. 162.
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given permission to remain in Russia.52
Francis and his company returned to Archangel on August ninth to
find the Provisional Government of Northern Russia in control. They
had taken over from the Bolsheviks in a bloodless coup a few hours
before Poole and his troops arrived.

For eight days the diplomatic

corps lived on the ships because there were not houses for rent in
Archangel.

Finally, Francis was able to get a three room apartment

·with a cook and a dining room maid. Francis I robust health did not
return; he continued to have severe abdominal pain which the doctors
treated with bed rest and soft diet.

The medical men attending him

felt an operation would be unnecessary •. Phil Jordan described their
situation in a letter to Mrs. Francis, and perhaps his request for
grits, roach powder and rat poison illustrates their living conditions
better than his description.53
Francis ·was quite pleased with the new government at Archangel.
It was socialist but-not Bolshevik and was headed

by

Nicholas Chaikovsky,

a revered and respected member of the Russian revoluti ona'ry movement.
Francis felt the government was the choice of three quarters of the
people in the northern half of the country. 5 4

On

September fourth

three battalions of American troops landed at Archangel, two of which
were immediately sent to the front; and the following day Francis with
the other Allied ambassadors, revlewed the batt,alion which remained.
After the revlew, General Poole, who was standing beside Francis during
.

52x3olshevik Propaganda, p. 950.

53Bliss, p. 162.
5�olshevik Propaganda, p 9
. 51.

\
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the ceremony, told him of a revolution that had occurred the night
before in Archangel.

Francis was horrifieq especially since the

timing made it appear the coup d'etat was sanctioned, if not executed
by the American ambassador.

Chaplin, a Russian naval officer on

General Poole's staff and a monarchist, had masterminded the kidnaP
ping of the ministers of the government.

They had been ta.�en by

steamer to Solovetski Island in the White Sea, nearly thirty hours
away.

Chaplin rationalized his actions by arguing that be had driven

out the Bolsheviks and established this new government only to find
the leadership too inexperienced in military and administrative mat
ters to govern and actually a hindrance to the British efforts to
recruit a Russian A.rrey', so he had deposed them.

Another factor, which

he did not men·bion, was that he and his tsarist ex-officer friends had
no place in Chaikovski 1 s regime. 5 5
Francis did not agree in anywise with Chaplin's actions and
immediately called a meeting of the representatives of the Allied
Mission for noon that day.

The Allied Ambassadors decidea to bring

back the deposed ministers, and they were reinstated shortly after
their return.

Chaplin was ordered not to publish any proclamations

concerning a new government in Archangel, but it was too late, for
Chaplin had already announced a new cabinet.

Two ministers of the

former government who had not been kidnapped published a statement
urging the people to resist Chaplin's domination as he was a monarchist,
\

and the Allied ambassadors also circulated a report on tlekidnapping.
The result naturally enough was a very confused populace.

55Kennan, Russia� the Hest, pp. 84-'217.
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Francis "Was receiving petitions from peasants, workmen and repre
sentatives of Zemstvos and Cooperatives supporting the deposed govern
ment and some from outlying areas stated that they were arming and
coming to Archangel to reinstate the former government. 56 In the
midst of this Francis heard that there was a general strike in town
and that American soldiers were operating the street cars.

It seems

the American battalion which had landed there had been recruited in
Detroit and about half of them had been conductors and motormen in
civilian life.

Francis felt this could be interpreted as interfering

in the internal affairs of Russia and was quite relieved to learn they
"Jere not charging fares. 57
Francis was suffering so much by the time he reached Archangel,
he re:mained j_n bed most of the time.

This did not keep him from having

Tureslxhenko to dinner on his two visits to Archangel, however; nor did
it prevent his keeping up with the complicated events in northern

Russia. 58 Army surgeons at Arcl1�gel examined Francis a.nd agreed on
their diagnosis:

his prostate gland must be surgically removed. How

ever, they would not perform the operation in spite of Francis'
entrea.ties and insisted he go to London. 59

Francis :intended to leave

,krchangel the middle of October, but Chaikovsky 1 s government had com
pletely collapsed by then and there was no respected anti-Bolshevik
political authority in the area.

As long as the Allies were there,

56Francis, Russia from the .American Emb�ssy, pp. '273-74.

57Bolshevik Propaganda, p. 9 54.
5

�rancis, Russia from the American �bassY, p. 291.

5

%alliday, pp. 88-89.
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order would be preserved, but the peasants were only interested in
protecting their own property and the workers were opposed to fighting
for the Allies.

Francis felt a deep moral obligation to stand by

and help these anti-Bolsheviks.
By November third Francis was much worse, and he cabled the State
Department, acknowledging his condition.

The following day the

American battleship Olympia arrived in Archangel, and Francis was

carried aboard on a stretcher .60 Two days later when the tide was

high enough to carry them over the sand bar, Francis left Russia.

6°i3liss, pp. 162-63.

VI
Ambassador in Name Only
The Olyrgpia arrived at Infragordon, on the northern coast of
Scotland, on the eighteenth of November after a very rough voyage
through Arctic gales and heavily mined seas.

Francis had endured sea

sickness in addition to the chills and high fever of his personal ill
The ambassador was taken to the United States Army Base Hospital

ness.

nearby and the following day his son John D. Perry Francis and his

wife arrived to be with Francis.1

By early December Francis was more comfortable and traveled to
London.

Woodrow Wilson was also in London, and Francis tried to see

the President to counsel him on what should be done about the Russian
Bolsheviks.

Francis' plan was tb�t he would return to Petrograd as
' '

soon as he had recovered his strength after his operation and occupy
the Embassy at Petrograd with fifty thousand American troops.

He

believed the British, French and Italian governments would also sand
their ambassadors and substantial troops back to Petrograd when they
learned Francis was there.

Once in Petrograd he 11 as Dean of the Diplo

matic Corps, would announce ••• to the Russian people that we had not
come for the purpose of interfering in their domestic affairs, but for
the protection of our Embassies and to enable the Russian people to
hold a free election with a fair count for members of a constituent
assenbly, that assembly to choose a form of government preferred by the
1i311ss, pp. 16.3-64.
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majority of the Russian people. 11 2 But he was frustrated at every turn
in his attempts to get an appointment viith Wilson. He finally did
receive an answer to his notes stating the President's mind had been
"running along the same lines" as the Ambassador's in regard to Russia,
but no time for a conference between them was suggested. 3
Francis believed he would have an opportunity to speak to Wilson
at a banquet given

by

days after Christmas.

the King in the President's honor one or two
Francis had received permission from Dr. Hughs.

Young, a your specialist sent by the State Department, to attend the
festive dinner. However, Francis never found himself close enough to
the President to speak with him. 4 1'he King of England, however, did
meet Francis as the gala affair was ending B..t.!d asked his opinion on
the Russian question. Francis replied that the Allies ought to over
throw the Bolshevik government.

The King responded that he though t so

too but that Wilson did not agree 'With them. 5 This is the only indica
tion of why Wilson would not find some time to discuss the Russian
situation with Francis, and it is characteristic of Wilson to avoid
someone who differed with him once his mind was made up on an issue.;
At the Paris Peace Conference the British Prime Minister, Lloyd
George, proposed that representatives from a ll of the organized politi
cal groups in Russia meet on Prinkipio Island in the Sea of Marmora on
February fifteenth to settle their differences.

The idea ·Has that a

2Francis, Russia from the American Embassy, p. 306.
3Ibid.
41Ialliday, p. 163.
5Francis, Russia from the American Embassy, p. 307.
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general armistice among all the wan·ing factions

in

Russia would be

declared giving the Russian people an opportunity to declare their
wishes.

Then, the Russians could declare their intentions, and could

formulate a basis for relationships with other nations.6 Wilson su�
ported this proposal, but Fra.�cis and Lansing were both opposed to it.
Francis,

in

vik Pat?ty

a note to Lansing on January 17, 191 9 -wrote,

...

11

the Bolshe-

has no cohesive principles other than opposition to

organized government and well-ordered society wherever it may exist. 1'7
Francis underwent major surgery in London on the fourth of Janu
ary, and by February first, he had recuperated sufficiently to leave
the hospital.
was

in

He immediately went to Paris where the Peace Conference

full swing.

around Wilson:

Once more Francis was able to talk with the men

Admiral Grayson, Secretary Lansing, General Bliss,

Colonel House, General Pershing and Henry White, but never with the
President. 8 Fra.ricis outlined his simple solution to the Russian
debacle to everyone who would listen.

This plan �as listened to

politely, but all the hearers advised Francis he must tell it to the
President.

Nothing would have suited him more, but his efforts to

make an appointment were thwarted at every turn.

What Francis apparently

had not learned was that while he was convalescing in London, the Peace
Conference had discussed the possibility of intervention in Russia and
discarded it. 9 Intervention was no longer popular, even in Europe,
6unterberger, p. 143.

7Tompkins, p.

98.

8Francis, Russia from the American Embassy. p. 308.
CJiialliday, p. 164.
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and in a few months a young Congressman from New York named Fiorello
LaGuardia would denounce Francis for his attempts to intervene in
northern Russia and demand the immediate return of all .American

troops.IO

Francis left Paris on the President's private train on February
14, 1919 and sailed on the George Washington to Boston with the
Presidential Party.

This certainly should have given Francis his

opportunity to discuss his plan with Woodro'W' Wilson, but there is no
evidence of it.

Francis and Phil Jordan accompanied the Wilsons on

their trip to Washington and remained in the capital city while Fran
cis testified before a Senate subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary on Bolshevism.

On March third Francis and Jordan left for

White Sulp hur Springs, West Virginia, where Francis planned to spend a
month resting before he returned to Russia. 11
Francis' dreams of returning to Russia were in vain.
.

Neither the

.

government of the United States nor the people of the United States
'li1anted intervention in Russia.

Furthermore, even if they had, Francis

never fully recovered his health and that plus his age would have
hindered his being the American to lead such a mission.

Needless to

say, Francis spoke out whenever possible for wilitary intervention in
Russia.

When asked,

11

Should the Allies leave Russia?" His reply was

unequivocably negative.

11

To do so, 11 he said,

of the people in the evacuated territory.

11

-will mean the slaughter

I -will say that if this

Bolshevik government remains in control of Russia peace in Europe is,
10i-ralliday, p. 183.
ll:a1iss, pp. 165-66.
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in my opinion, impossible.

Germany will exploit Russia if this disor

der cc:..1�,inues, and ins_tead of having lost 1;,he war, Germany will win,

and in ten years she will be stronger than she was in August 1914. 11 12
By the spring of 1919 even the United States was alarmed by the
tales of Bolshevik terror and the rapid spread of this ideology, but
no one felt morally impelled to interfere in the internal affairs of
another nation.

Francis declared in vain that the United States

couldn't leave one hundred eighty million people helpless and hopeless
under the tyrannical rule of 11 a ruthless, conscienceless, and blood
thirsty oligarchy, directed

by

a man with the brain of a sage and the

heart of a monster • • • • It was our duty to eradicate this foul
monster--Bolshevism-branch, root and trunk. 11 1.3
Francis resigned what had become the meaningless post of Ambassa
dor to Russia in 1921 and spent the last six years of bis life insist
ing that he might have saved Russia from Communism if be ha d been
allowed to return to Petrograd.with fifty thousand troops. 14

1211What Hr. Francis Would Do," The Outlook CXXXI (March 19, 1919),
p. 46.3.
13nu11es, p. 15 .
6
14
Halliday, p. 212.

Conclusions
David Rowland Francis has received harsh treatment at the hands
of analyst's of the international scene, but to keep things in perspec
tive, it must be remembered how ignorant all Americans were of Russian
political

and

social tradition in 1917.

There is no question that Francis was ill-suited for the role of
ambassador to Russia.

He had had no previous diplomatic experience

and was awkward in the majestic and formal atmosphere of continental
diplomacy.

After the March Revolution the American ambassador needed

to display leadership, but Francis did not have the experience to
provide the guidance needed in a very complex situation.

His

advanced years were a distinct drawback as he had less stamina, and
it was difficult for him to adapt to a new life style or to assimilate

new and different ideas. His temperament was against his succeeding
in this new sphere, for although he was a kind person, he could be
blunt and did speak his mind.

Furthermore, be was accustomed to

understanding a problem a,."ld succeeding in finding the solution.

The

situations that he fot1nd in Petrograd and that he faced in Vologda and
.Archangel were complex and frustrating for him.

Fr8..1-icis was unable to

understand the opaque process of Russian political lif f after the Tsar
Yas overthrown.

Terms like anarchist, radical socialist, Bolshevik

and social revolutionary had no real meaning for him, and he found it
difficult if not impossible to distinguish among them.
The American ambassador was so pleased with himself for being the

first to recognize the Provisional Government and therefore gotten
ahead of the British and the French, that he failed to realize he had
vastly overrated the effect of American recognition. He expected
Russia to look to the United States as a model of political develo:p
ment especially as she had thrown off a monarchy as the United States
had done nearly one hundred fifty years before.
Max M. Laserson argues tha t not only was Francis poorly prepared
for his position, he failed to strengthen the anti-Bolshevik element
when he had the opportunity.

One such occasion occurred after the

suppression of the Kornilov revolt when the British, French and
Italian ambassadors sent a note to Kerensky insisting that military
discipline be fully restored. Francis did abstain from signing the
note, but La.serson felt that Francis had a further opportunity here
to strengthen a large portion of the Russian intelligentsia �hich
�as more favorably inclined to the United States than to France and
England and also constituted the majority in the Petrograd Council of
Workers• and Soldiers' Deputies,

Lasersan considered Francis so

poorly informed on Russian political thinking that any efforts in
that direction were destined to be unsuccessful. l Another problem
to this type of interference in Russian affairs that was not
primarily of Francis• making was that the United States had not
drafted any policy towards revolutionary Russia except recognition of
the Provisional Government

and

support of that government while Russia

remained in the war.
Francis has also been criticized for his friendship with }fa.dam

1Laserson, pp. 497-99.
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Mathilde de Crrun.

Revisionist historian William Appleman Williams

takes the view that Francis was "both indiscreet and exceedingly
indifferent t� the responsibilities of his position" in his relation
ship with her. 2 George F. Kennan, on the other hand, found that cer
tain charges against Madame de Cram, appearing in documents in the
Francis MSS, originated in sources which today can be identified as
unreliable.

Kennan also reports that the more sensible and

.experienced members of the embassy staff showed sympathy and under
standing towards this 11 elderly runbassador who had left wife and family
at home and was enduring the rigors of a belated and unaccustomed
bacherlorhood in a strange lana. 11.3
A young American Yriter Malcolm Davis, who spoke Russian and had
had numerous conversations with Russians :from aD. walks of life,
raised an interesting question:

how could a man who had represented

the United States before the tsar, continue to serve in that position
when the people of the country.had removed the tsar

by

a violent revo

lution? Obviously Wilson approved of Francis' actions and was satis
fied uith bis judgment for he had many opportunities to recall him
and did not; and Francis offered to resign.

A major factor in both

Wilson's and Francis' thinking was that Francis was not accredited to
a particular government but rather to the Russian people.

In }!arch of

1918 when Wilson sent a note to the All-Russian Congress, it was not
addressed to the government but to the People· of Russia; and Francis
was always exhorting the people of Russia to take up arms against the
2williams, p. 113 •

3Kenna.n, Russia Leaves the War, p. 40.
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Germans and to rise up against the Bolsheviks.
In spite of all �is shortcomings and frustrations, Francis faced
his difficult. task llith resolution and enthusiasm.

One has to res pect

his physical courage in the midst of strains a nd personal danger, and
his fidelity to high standards and to the obligations he took towards
the Russian people and the Allied powers.

Furthermore, even his most

unsympathetic critics admit that he took some very practical steps
which were both expedient and sound.

For instance, he did procure

huge sums of credit for the Provisional Govermnent which badly needed
such support and enabled the Russian forces to stay in the war as long
as they did. And it was Francis who recommended not only that a rail
way commission be sent to Russia, but also that Russia send a commis
sion to the United States to purch ase railway supplies, locomotives
and rolling stock that Russia needed. 4 Both of these groups were able
to work together before the Bolshevik Revolution and were no t destroyed
by it, but continued to function under the Soviet government.
In spite of Francis' lack of understanding of ideologies, politi
cal parties, and events, his intuition was correct about the horrors
and evils of Bolshevism. The validity of his distrust is borne out
by their leaving the 'War which was mandatory if they were to preserve
their socialist state.
this fact.

The aid from the Allied po�ers could not change

The United States recognition of the Lenin-Trotsky regime

would have merely stamped our approval on their activities; it would
not have changed the direction of Lenin's plans. The Bolsheviks held
no brief with any of America's humanitarian goals; they �ere only
4Laserson, p. 501.
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interested in the future of the state, not

in

the plight of the

individual.
During this investigation Francis' role

in

American diplomacy in

revolutionary Russia gradually crystalized for the author.

George F.

Kennan expressed it best v1hen he said Francis' "political role was not
a great one, but his simple, outspoken, American pragmatism provided a
revealing contrast to the intensely theoretical controversies that
raged around him, and one comes away from the reading of his memirs
with the feeling that America could have been in some ways much worse
served, if in other ways better. 11 5

5Kennan, Russia Leaves� War, p. 41.
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